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#650, 28 November 2001

Fighting the Fidayeens: Combating Suicide Terrorism in Kashmir

D Suba Chandran
Research Officer, IPCS

Suicide terrorism in Kashmir is bound to increase in the coming days given the internal dynamics and objectives of the various militant groups operating there..??

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Besides the Lashkar-e-Toiba, Hizbul Mujahideen, Jaish-e-Mohammad and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, there are a number of minor militant groups comprising of Kashmiris, Pakistanis and Afghans. The Hizbul is considered the most indigenous militant group and its objective is very limited: it fights for an independent Kashmir and does not support the merger of Kashmir with Pakistan. The Lashkar-e-Toiba, comprising mainly of Pakistanis, is well organized and is independent (especially financially) of the ISI (Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence) when compared to other militant organizations. For the Lashkar, Kashmir is a means to achieve its pan-Islamic objectives.?

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Understanding the objectives of these two organizations and their limitations, the ISI created the Jaish with Maulana Masood Azhar as its chief. Jaish has been involved in all suicide attacks carried out in Kashmir. The first ever suicide attack took place when a student rammed his car at the gate of the Badamibagh cantonment in April 2000. A similar second attack took place in the same spot in December 2000. The Jaish, coming into being much later than other militant groups, is attempting desperately to find some ‘space’ for itself through spectacular acts aimed at capturing the attention of people both inside and outside Kashmir.??

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Second, suicide terrorism results in a lot of publicity for the militant group that perpetrates the attack. In Kashmir, this publicity is very essential as militant groups need to compete with each other to gain popular support and/or prove their invincibility to their mentors and clientele. Publicity is crucial to attract more funds, especially from abroad, and boost up recruitment drive inside Kashmir; the more Kashmiris in its fold, the more support the group can garner in terms logistics, planning and escape.

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Third, Kashmiri participation in militancy has been on the decline in recent years. The suicide attack at the Srinagar Legislative Assembly complex was carried out by a Pakistani; and, the Jaish and the Lashkar have been regularly carrying out the so-called fidayeen attacks with Pakistanis. The main reason for these fidayeen attacks is to keep the hopes of the Kashmiris alive reminding them that Pakistan will liberate Kashmir.?

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Fourth, there exists close linkages between the militant groups, especially the above-mentioned three groups and the rightist political groups of Pakistan who patronize or/and run the madrassas. Continuous indoctrination in these madrassas has produced a number of “jihadi robots”, who could be used as human bombs.?

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How to combat suicide terrorism in Kashmir? What are the options before India?

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The first option is to strike the roots of terror, be it hot pursuit or surgical strike. Both these options sound easier, but would be extremely difficult in practical terms. A hot pursuit involves chasing the militants inside PoK (Pakistan occupied Kashmir). There are a number of Pakistani military posts along the Line of Control that would have to be dealt with militarily. A surgical strike, on the other hand, involves wiping out the terrorist camps in PoK based on intelligence regarding their accurate location. Besides, such a strike needs to be undertaken with missiles based on Indian soil or from air violating Pakistani airspace. There is every possibility that such strikes could hit other targets, resulting in loss of innocent lives. Both hot pursuit and surgical strikes are bound to escalate the conflict between India and Pakistan and the possibility of an all-out war cannot be ruled out. Whereas the Indian military establishment would be eager to exercise this option, it is doubtful whether the ruling BJP, rhetorically impressive but politically spineless, would resort to it.

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The second option is to send specialized ground teams to physically annihilate the leaders and the camps. This requires precise information. Israel has used this option in tracking the militants even in other countries and assassinating them. Such counter attacks would, in the short run, increase militant attacks but in the long run, yield better results.

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Thirdly, India should take concrete steps at the national and international levels. Instead of merely accusing Pakistan and the militant groups for the violence in Jammu and Kashmir, it is very essential that the much talked about White Paper on ISI activities in India be tabled in the Parliament. This should be followed by diplomatic pressure, instead of media statements, both at national and international levels.?

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Finally, unnecessary criticism of the security forces in the Valley dampening their morale should be checked. Little understanding the hostile environment in which they operate, the security forces, along with their planning, intelligence and alertness, have come under unfair criticism. Given the nature of suicide bombing, it is tough for any security force to tackle a bomb, which can think, move, dodge and be ready to destroy itself.

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