Economic
mismanagement and corruption has been the two major issues related to failure of
the governance process in Jammu and Kashmir. Where did the problem arise When
did the rot set in
Habibullah
states that it started with Ghulam Muhammad Bakshi becoming the Prime Minister
of Jammu and Kashmir in 1953, to achieve the Union governments main objective
to undermine Sheikh Abdullah and his NC support base. Bakshi undermined the
Sheikhs support base by awarding contracts to exploit the resources of the
states forests and by granting licenses for transport and tourist associated
activities and for the distribution of essential commodities all for a price.
Since Bakshi was quickly able to control the agitation resulting from Abdullahs
unceremonious sacking, the policy was considered a success. The Bakshi tradition
set an unhealthy economic precedent.
Since
it suited Indian interests, there were hardly any efforts by the Union
government in the 1950s and 1960s to prevent this corruption process. As a
result, the effort to undermine the Sheikhs support base and construct an
Indian constituency, created a corrupt lobby that included officials from the
state and union governments, contractors and others.
This
corrupt lobby became a state by itself; when the NC returned to power, instead
of checking it, the NC went along with it. This lobby also became the visible
face of the Union government and became the object of local hatred. The
militants in the late 1980s and 1990s attacked this lobby to gain legitimacy,
but it is doubtful, whether the militant movement arose only to target the
corrupt elements as Habibullah comments. According to him, the uprising in
1989-90 was essentially predatory, the militants preying on corrupt elements
within the states administrative infrastructure. The militant attacks on
corrupt elements in the state, as one also notices in India's northeast, is
mainly to garner legitimacy for their militant movement and increase their
popularity.
What
Habibullah does not point out is that, ironically, this corrupt lobby became a
source of revenue for the militant groups at a later stage. In the second phase,
they were targeted not to gain public support, but since they were the only ones
who could be targeted and extorted. Extortion then became an industry; and was
not reported in public for obvious reasons of not losing popular support!
Habibullah's
report then reflects on a crucial phenomenon 'Ikhwans'. He considers them to
be a 'notable group, who continue to prosper from the war. How do they
benefit from the conflict Is that because they were allowed to retain their
weapons, so that they could run their own extortion industry Or is it because
some of them were incorporated into the Special Operations Group (SOG) Or is it
because the state has failed to integrate them into the mainstream and decided
to use them for outsourcing some of their 'difficult coordinates'
Habibullah's
portrayal of this group, which really broke the bone of militancy during
1993-1996 could have been even handed rather than seeing them as a beneficiary
of war. What could this group do when they did not have public sympathy; be the
target of other militants; and being not integrated into the mainstream Unless
a long-term policy is devised by the State and Union governments, which includes
re-integrating them into society, defining their role in counter insurgency
operations and disarming them taking into consideration the threat from other
militant groups, Ikhwans would continue to have a vested economic interest in
the continuation of conflict.
Besides
the counter militants, the militants also have a vested economic interest in
keeping the conflict going. Habibullah states that the militant organizations
are able to recruit as they offer the best opportunity to make moneyFor
those taking to this course, life may be short, but it is sweet. Recruits have
access to luxuries unavailable to common folk, such as staying in houseboats and
five star hotels and consorting with young women, themselves often orphans with
no prospect for marriage and fed up with common place, increasingly burdensome
lives(Kashmir youth) participation is motivated by economic considerations than
by ideology.
Is
every Kashmiri who is resorting to violence doing so for only economic
considerations No doubt, a section has taken up arms for economic reasons; but
there are others who have done this for certain non-economic and political
reasons. Numbers may vary, but the fact is that one should not oversimplify the
situation by asserting that every Kashmiri youth pursues violence for economic
reasons. For example, the day-to-day pressure from the security forces, what is
recognized as human rights violations by the Army and other paramilitary forces,
does have a significant role to play in this regard.
If
economic considerations are primary for the Kashmiri youths to take up arms and
the state could provide them economic sustenance, would they give up violence
Would increasing their recruitment into the State police forces address this
issue Instead of focusing on the SOG, would a general emphasis on using the
police forces be a better approach This would not only provide more jobs to the
local youth, but in the long run would also reduce the presence of military and
paramilitary forces, thereby reducing the allegations of human rights
violations.