Chinese perspectives on the
Kashmir
problem require attention for at least three reasons: First,
China
is occupying over 20 percent of the total area of the former
Kashmir
State
. A large tract, around 38,000 sq km in Aksai-Chin, was captured by
China
during the Sino-Indian border war of 1962. Later, it acquired another 5000 sq km from
Pakistan
. Second,
Kashmir
is the only issue that can create fissures in future Sino-Pak relations. Third, the Chinese stand on
Kashmir
indicates the maturity of Chinese foreign policy behaviour.
The Chinese outlook on
Kashmir
evolved in two stages. From the 1950s to 1980s,
China
followed a largely pro-Pakistan policy due to its own pariah status in the international system and animosity with
India
after the 1962 war. Mao had always treated
India
in a derogatory fashion, but had serious misgivings over
India
’s
Tibet
policy. By the 1960s, the widening Sino-Soviet rift and the latter’s support to
India
on
Kashmir
had put
China
on the defensive; it began courting
Pakistan
and supporting it on all issues, including
Kashmir
. Chinese statements on
Kashmir
focused on two points: (i) it regarded
Kashmir
as a disputed territory, and (ii) it supported the principle of self-determination for the people of
Kashmir
. The Sino-Pak Joint Communiqué of 3 May 1962 and the subsequent Boundary Agreement of 2 March 1963 recognized the disputed nature of
Kashmir
. The latter agreement provided for the formal delimitation and demarcation of the boundary between
China
’s Xinjiang and contiguous areas of
Pakistan
occupied
Kashmir
(PoK). Article VI of the Agreement stated that, after the settlement of the
Kashmir
dispute between
India
and
Pakistan
, the sovereign authority concerned would open negotiations with the People’s Republic of
China
on the boundary as delimited by Article II of the same Agreement. During this period,
China
supported
Pakistan
and the ‘just struggle of the
Kashmir
people for self-determination’, and endorsed the relevant UN resolutions to the discomfiture of
India
.
However, in the 1980s, Chinese policy on
Kashmir
underwent a metamorphosis.
China
’s rise as a Great Power, coupled with its acceptance by the international fraternity, led to a decline in its radical foreign policy. There was also a perceptible thaw in Sino-Indian relations, particularly after the visit of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to
Beijing
in 1988. Thereafter,
China
dropped the mention of the term ‘self-determination’ and the references to the UN resolutions on
Kashmir
. It seems, however, that the disclaimer of ‘self-determination’ had something to do with the increasing demand for self-determination in the Xinjiang and
Tibet
. Therefore,
China
started projecting
Kashmir
as essentially a ‘bilateral’ dispute between
India
and
Pakistan
. Interestingly,
China
’s apprehensions about multilateralism persuaded it to shun a role for itself in the dispute-resolution, which reinforced
India
’s emphasis on bilateralism.
Since the early 1990s, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and its own problem of insurgency in Xinjiang have further modified Chinese perspectives on
Kashmir
.
China
is under no illusion that in Xinjiang and
Kashmir
the insurgents were being trained and funded by Islamic fundamentalists operating from
Afghanistan
and
Pakistan
. This perception led
China
to adopt a neutral role during the Kargil War. While
China
did not wish to criticize
Pakistan
, it saw merit in
India
’s assertion that the issue was essentially one of terrorist infiltration across the LoC. Hence, without naming
Pakistan
, it called for maintaining the sanctity of the LoC.
The continued impasse over
Kashmir
between
India
and
Pakistan
endangers the prospects of a regional security order which
China
is encouraging in
South Asia
. First, it believes that the
Kashmir
issue may lead the two countries to the brink of a nuclear war. Second,
Kashmir
is also impeding the economic development of both countries. Finally, this can spill over into Xinjiang. Therefore,
China
’s own national interest demands an early resolution of the problem.
It is dubious if
China
will support the idea of an independent
Kashmir
despite having advocated ‘self-determination’ in the past. An independent
Kashmir
will add another Muslim state on its border, and bolster Uyghur nationalism in Xinjiang.
China
may also have to compete with
Pakistan
and the
US
for influence in
Kashmir
. Again, the entire state of
Jammu and Kashmir
joining with
Pakistan
or
India
may not find favour with the Chinese; for, in the first case,
Pakistan
would extend upto to the Chinese border, making the situation in Xinjiang volatile and, in the second case,
China
’s road links with
Pakistan
would be cut off by the expansion of
Indian territory
. The maintenance of status quo, therefore, would best serve Chinese interests. It is for this reason that
China
formally pleads for a negotiated settlement of the dispute between
India
and
Pakistan
which is likely to reinforce and legitimize the status quo.
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