Jammu & Kashmir - Articles

General Musharraf in his famous 12 January speech mentioned that Kashmir runs in Pakistan’s blood. A small correction is necessary. It runs in Pakistani military’s blood. The report is candid on the importance of Kashmir for Pakistan’s military. It says: Military and military dominated governments have been far more inclined to assume an uncompromising posture, partly because of the Pakistan military’s hostility towards and suspicions of India but also due to the imperatives of regime survival.

Elsewhere in the report, it is also mentioned “important elements within the high command…want to bog India down indefinitely in the Kashmir quagmire rather than seek a compromise, oblivious of the adverse consequences for Pakistan’s economy and polity. Given the perceived achievements of Kashmiri militancy, the military will therefore, resist changing the policy unless its costs come to be perceived as outweighing for its parent institution.”

However, some of the recent actions and statements of Musharraf does not fit in this generalization. He did take measures (half hearted or otherwise) to control cross border terrorism. Indian leadership at the highest level has admitted that cross border terrorism has in fact come down. At the political level Musharraf announced recently that Pakistan would be willing to get away from the UN Resolutions on Kashmir. Is Musharraf an exception? Would any other military leader be it Ayub or Zia dared to take this bold path? For that matter, would any of the political leadership, be it Zulfikar or Benazir or Nawaz would have the courage to take two bold steps – at political and military levels? Does the change also mean that there is a change in the policy as the “costs” are being perceived as “outweighing the parent institution?”.

Kashmir conflict, the report mentions “is also used by the military to justify high defence expenditures, including acquisition of nuclear weapons.” If this is true, as the report says, then military in Pakistan would never agree to resolve Kashmir conflict. In that case, resolving Kashmir conflict for Pakistan’s military is digging its own grave. Majority in India also believe that Kashmir provides the rationale for Pakistan military’s existence (Some Indians would like to extend this to say that Kashmir provides a rationale for the very existence of Pakistan!). Is this perception real? If it is real, then why Musharraf should would like to resolve it? May be for a Nobel Prize for Peace? (In that case, one can safely presume he would not be alive to receive it!)

Linking Kashmir totally with Pakistan’s military is exaggeration. The late 1970s and the early 1980s, witnessed the alarming growth of Pakistan’s nuclear programme and increased defence expenditure when Kashmir was least important for Pakistan’s military and even for Pakistani nation. Pakistan military’s threat perceptions towards India has been defined more by what happened in 1971 and not because of what happened in 1947-48. In other words, the military defeat in 1971 and the subsequent breaking up of Pakistan that would provide the reasons for military’s continued hostility than Kashmir. Kashmir is only a means and not the reason to bleed India..

If this could be taken as something closer to the truth, then one could see a pattern in Musharraf’s policies. Clearly Pakistan’s “Use Kashmir to bleed India” policy has started back firing. Unlike Afghanistan for Russia, Kashmir wound, though for India has been bleeding, it has successfully hold on to it. What more could Pakistan do in Kashmir in terms of militancy without burning its own fingers? No doubt, the jihadi policy has become a double edged sword for Pakistan. Worse, it has lost the handle, now any where Pakistan touches the sword, it gets cut. May be there is a genuine realization at the highest levels of military (though it is doubtful, whether it is shared by the entire military leadership) that the jihadi policy is no more yielding the desired results. May be Pakistani military realizes that it could use political means to reach an understanding with India on Kashmir. Thanks to the nuclearization, with or without the jihadis, Kashmir has become a nuclear flashpoint. Indians may not like to believe it, but the international community is convinced. So why should the Pakistani military depend solely on militancy?

Whether one likes it or not in India, Musharraf seems to be India’s best bet in Pakistan. It is in India’s interest that an understanding on Kashmir when General Musharraf is in power and when he has the power to deliver what he says. One should not forget that no one thought Pakistan would ever give up its Afghan-Taliban policy; Musharaf did. No one thought that the jihadis inside Pakistan could be tamed; Musharraf did. Can he deliver on the eastern front? That is the risk that India should be willing to take. It is worth taking.