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#1036, 18 May 2003
 
The Indo-Pak Riddle: Neither forward nor backward nor stationary
D Suba Chandran
Research Officer, IPCS
 

India’s decision to engage Pakistan politically was due to four reasons. First, its border confrontation in 2002 yielded no tangible gains, politically or militarily; neither has the number of militant attacks nor their intensity reduced. The civilian casualty figure in 2002 due to militancy in Jammu and Kashmir was around 900, which is comparable to the 750 casualties in 2000. The confrontationist approach has therefore not reduced militancy.

 

Second, the international pressure on Pakistan since 9/11 has not coerced it enough to give up its support to militancy. The fact that Pakistan is an active partner in the US led War against Terrorism has only reduced US pressure. India, to its dismay, has realized that it cannot expect much from the international community, especially the US, to pressurize Pakistan to stop cross border terrorism.

 

Third, the Indian threats of preemptive strike and limited war did not cut much ice, either in Pakistan or in the international community.

 

And, finally, despite the successful conduct of elections and the new government formed under Mufti Mohamad Sayeed, New Delhi realized that peace still remains unattainable due to continuing violence in the State. The military approach having failed, India has decided on adopting the political option.

 

For Pakistan too, the “low intensity conflict” strategy has failed to yield tangible results. India could not be coerced either by an open Kargil type conflict or by the decade long low intensity conflict strategy. Despite militant attacks, India has successfully conducted elections in Jammu and Kashmir; neither the All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC) – Pakistan’s political proxy, nor the terrorists – its military proxy, could prevent the formation of a new government. Having appreciated the futility of the military approach Musharraf also wants to explore a political approach.

 

However, it is ironical that India and Pakistan despite having failed to achieve any gains from their military confrontation in 2002 continue to claim having achieved success! 

 

Can this initiative lead to peace between the two countries? This would depend greatly on the extent to which both countries are willing to move beyond their earlier rigid positions. The fact that the Indian Prime Minister chose Srinagar to announce his new initiative is indicative of his willingness to discuss Kashmir with Pakistan; one of the main reasons for the failure of the Agra summit was India’s reluctance to discuss Kashmir.

 

The initiative’s success depends on the preconditions both countries attach to their mutual dialogue. If India harps on stop-terrorism-first or Pakistan wants Kashmir-first-rest-later, then this initiative would turn into another unproductive engagement. If one goes by recent statements on both sides, it appear, both are unwilling to learn from the lessons of the past. While the Indian Prime Minster has repeatedly made statements on cross border terrorism, there has been uproar against any attempt to keep Kashmir in the backburner inside Pakistan’s Parliament.

 

Many in India consider the conversion of the Line of Control (LoC) into an international border as what India can concede at most to Pakistan. In return, it expects Pakistan to stop interfering in Kashmir. It is a different matter whether such an attempt would establish peace in Kashmir and whether Pakistan would stop interfering, but this is what India could concede maximum. Is this acceptable to Pakistan?

 

For Pakistan, the conversion of the LoC into the international border is only formalizing the status quo which it has been striving to erode politically and militarily. Besides, the Pakistan government cannot agree to such an option at this juncture when it is facing immense pressure from the opposition groups over the Legal Framework Order in the Parliament. Beisdes, the rightist parties led by the Muttahida Majlis Amal (MMA) and the jihadi organizations led by Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad are against any concessions to India over Kashmir. For them, such a solution would be totally unacceptable and would be perceived as a Western conspiracy against Pakistan. Moreover, the military and the ISI are not likely to loosen their hold over Kashmir and accept this proposition.

 

Here lies the problem before any Indo-Pak rapprochement. Both are caught in the web which they had systematically spun over the years. It is therefore essential to deconstruct the enemy image that both countries have cultivated so that the population on both sides is willing to consider reasonable solutions. Political engagement through renewal of ties in the social, economic and cultural fields can create a conducive atmosphere. Meanwhile, Kashmir needs to be discussed through an institutionalized bilateral mechanism. Until this happens, history will only repeat itself and the present confrontation will continue.

 
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