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#1694, 11 April 2005
 
The Bus between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad : Observations and Analyses
D Suba Chandran
Assistant Director, IPCS
 

The much expected bus service between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad finally took place on 7 April 2005, despite threats from militants. What are the ground realities? Where would India, Pakistan and Kashmir go from here?

The popular support for the bus service between the Srinagar and Muzaffarabad is divided. While the most in Kashmir valley are enthusiastic about the bus service, response from the other two regions of J&K - Jammu and Ladakh are less enthusiastic and in fact cautious and guarded. Outside J&K some seen it with enthusiasm, while others with cynicism and indifference. The event is perceived more as Indo-Pak one rather than intra-Kashmiri. Herein lies the main problem - if the Kashmiris feel alienated from the Indian main stream, the latter remains enthusiastic and indifferent depending on the event, their political and regional backgrounds.

The political and militant support amongst the Kashmiris also is divided. While the ruling PDP- Congress, along with the main opposition led by Omar Farooq, support the bus, the extreme Right oppose it. The political support for the bus was explicit and encouraging, especially when both the ruling and opposition parties conveyed their support towards it when the militants attacked the State tourism center one day before the event.

The separatist faction led by Syed Ali Geelani and the state wing of the BJP oppose the bus service. (It is surprising to see the state wing of BJP opposing the bus service, despite the fact that the idea of bus was consolidated during Vajpayee's government). The militant groups are also highly divided. The pro-Kashmiri Hizbul Mujahideen supports the bus service (though has not openly admitted); the pro-jihad militant groups (Lashkar-e-Toiba and the Jaish-e-Mohammad) oppose the bus service.

The militants are likely to target the bus service and those who travel. The government may not be able to provide security for those people for ever, hence the possibility of the passengers or their relatives becoming the target cannot be ruled out. This is sure to reduce the support for militancy in the Valley. The state in Kashmir and India is counting on such a possibility. However, the loss of support to militancy is unlikely to transfer into support for the state.

The Government of India and the Government of Jammu and Kashmir seems to perceive the bus service as an end and not as a means to further the intra-Kashmir interactions. It is unfortunate, that both the governments in their enthusiasm, succeeded in making the event as "Indian" instead of "Kashmiri". Second, the Indian Union government seems to be addressing the "problem of Kashmir" and not the "problem in Kashmir". Unless the second is addressed, the first one would always remain a distant dream. The Union government should use the bus service to initiate a discussion with the Kashmiris.

The media, especially the electronic, has played a crucial role. It has created a hype both positive and negative on the event. If its coverage of the bus journey and the transfer of passengers has made the event into an emotional one, its coverage of the militant attack of the State tourism building one day before the flagging off the bus created a fear and a sense of despair both inside and outside J&K. The repeated visual presentation of fire engulfing the building and some false and presumptuous reporting are warnings for the government to deal with new forces. For example, an anchor reporting for a leading TV without meeting the passengers of the bus announced that the attack has created a fear and panic and are planning to reconsider their travel! It was also erroneously reported that the bus was to be flagged off from the very building which was burning. Such reports, bringing the event to every one's drawing room would add extra pressure on the government. The negative influence of the TV coverage of the ill fated IC 814 should be remembered. The government, however, went ahead with the bus service and did not postpone it.

Would there be further CBMs? Would the Union government take extra steps vis-a-vis the Kashmiris and also vis-a-vis Pakistan? Would India agree to initiate a series discussion on Kashmir, at least to start a process, when Musharraf comes to India? These three questions would remain more important than simply sustaining the bus service. If India is to see the bus service as a means to further intra-Kashmir interactions and to strengthen the peace process with Pakistan, the event would become a crucial mile stone. On the other hand if India is to see it as an end, the event would mark as one of those false dawns, that has remained peculiar to the process (or lack of it) between India, Pakistan and Kashmir.

 
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