Pakistan: A Trip Report
PR Chari
N Manoharan, Research Officer, IPCS
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Panelists:
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PR Chari
C Raja Mohan
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PR Chari
During his recent visit to Pakistan Prof. Chari felt a mood change had occurred in Pakistan. The transformation was partly due to the cricket and the exposure of large numbers of the common people on both sides to each other, which was earlier confined to Indians visiting their relatives in Pakistan. There was a sense of expectation and hope regarding the ongoing peace process. Prime Minister Vajpayee was especially popular in Pakistan and people remembering his initiatives as Indian Foreign Minister in 1977-79. The Congress was generally perceived as not being Pak-friendly, again due to a hangover of the past and remembrance of Indira Gandhi halving their country in 1971. Hence, the change of mind in the Indian electorate, reflected in the recent exit poll results unfavorable to the BJP, might disappoint the Pakistanis.
There were three reasons for the positive change in Pakistan. First, except for the brainwashed jihadis, the next generation Pakistanis were not interested in a state of permanent hostility with India; there was also a sense of weariness with the long Indo-Pak stand-off. Second, Kashmir was basically a Punjabi obsession and other provinces were hardly interested. The over-kill by the official media on this issue had created a sense of boredom and contrary-mindedness in the people, similar to the “India shining  campaign becoming a national joke in India. There was much apprehension about Pakistan’s slow growth patterns compared to India’s robust economic development, and awareness that US was using Pakistan in its “war on terror  in Afghanistan.
Interestingly, no change had occurred in Pakistan’s dealings with Indian embassy officials. The restrictions on them, surveillance, and harassment continued unlike their counterparts in India. This was the doings of the Pakistani intelligence, which otherwise felt insecure about their importance in the government.
Providing insights on the Conference, Prof. Chari said Kashmir was not mentioned despite the presence of several hardliners; even references to plebiscite were missing in the deliberations. Surprisingly, there was only a mild reaction to the suggestion of converting the LoC into an international border. India’s no-first use policy was believed to have been given up due to its various qualifications, which placed a premium on a more orthodox nuclear deterrent relationship being sought. Pakistan was worried about India’s Rs. 25,000 crore re-equipment plans and its evolving “cold start’ strategy given its precarious financial situation and inability to reciprocate. A new emphasis could therefore be placed on increasing mobility and firepower and on its nuclear deterrent.
Prof. Chari expressed cautious optimism on the future of Indo-Pak relations, but stressed the importance of systemic factors in this regard. The economic dimension was gaining prominence in both countries. Religious extremism was viewed as a common enemy. There was a feeling in Pakistan that its anomalous policies on terrorism could not be continued forever. In India, there was a sense that New Delhi must normalize its relations with Pakistan before projecting itself as a great power on the world stage. Moreover, the US presence in Pakistan was encrusting for various reasons, which would ensure stability in South Asia rather than the other way around.
C Raja Mohan
Dr. Raja Mohan shared Prof. Chari’s views regarding the positive mood change and new warmth in Pakistan. However, the common people do not count for much and there was no similar mood change in the government of Pakistan. Hence it was pertinent to look at how the government viewed the peace process.
The perceptions of the Pakistani Foreign Office were gloomy. There was a belief that the peace process was an election gimmick. The statements emanating from the Pakistani Army were non-committal about improving the bilateral relationship. An impression obtained, though misplaced, that India was opposing Pakistan’s entry into the ARF. The continuing construction of the Baglihar project and postponement of the Muzzafurabad-Srinagar bus talks has not gone down well with the Foreign Office. Both the Foreign Offices seemed unable to dilute their positions on Kashmir.
The Army was not concerned with the peace process at this stage and its policy was to wait and watch. Musharraf’s hardline statements on Kashmir on three different occasions in the recent past were designed for the domestic constituency. The bench marks for process on the Kashmir issue included CBMs like troop reductions, talks with the Hurriyat and maintaining the ceasefire.
From the Indian view point, the level of violence had not come down, although there was a considerable fall in infiltration. There was also the question of simultaneity. There was no parallel progress in trade or bus services and so on. The CBMs in Kashmir, moreover, had to be pursued on domestic considerations and not dictated by Pakistan. In July-August both countries would have to reach a judgment on priorities of issues.
India should not get itself in the trap of ‘give and take’. The trade factor could be used to further its relations rather than insist on MFN status. The visa regime could be further relaxed to allow the hassle-free entry of Pakistanis, as they would provide some leverage for India. It should try and exploit whatever space was available rather than wait for a big agreement to be reached. It should also find more ways to enhance our influence in Pakistan and create new support bases.
The Chairman’s Remarks
Maj. Gen. Banerjee, who was also a member of the Indian team, recalled that General Karamat’s inaugural remarks highlighted the need to address nuclear, missile issues and military CBMs and stressed the need for dialogue. It appeared that Pakistan was serious about these impending discussions and that it was likely to propose a ‘strategic restraint regime’ at the forthcoming talks with India. He referred to two important papers presented, on “Nuclear Doctrine  by Shireen Mazari and on “Pakistan’s Missile Posture  by Brig. Naeem Salik.
On what threatens Pakistan’s nuclear posture, Shireen identified the following:-
· India’s limited war doctrine.
· Upsetting of the conventional arms balance.
· Introduction of a BMD system by India.
· India’s new war doctrine ? ‘cold start’ and others.
· Finally, a possible recognition of India’s nuclear status by the international community and particularly the US.
On the future course of Pakistan’s nuclear posture, she identified nine critical factors that would contribute to a positive outcome:-
· Resolution of Kashmir.
· Maintenance of an effective ceasefire.
· International observers on the LoC.
· Nuclear dialogue between India and Pakistan.
· Need to avoid military brinkmanship.
· Strengthening existing communications between the two countries.
· Nuclear transparency.
· Securing nuclear systems against accidental war.
· Institutionalising nuclear security dialogue structures.
On missile postures Brig. Salik clarified the Pakistani missile programme to consist of the following:-
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Hatf was a generic name for Pakistan’s missiles.
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Hatf-2 Abdali 180 kms.
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Hatf-3 Ghaznavi 280 kms.
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Hatf-4 Shaheen I 600-750 kms.
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Hatf-5 Ghauri 1300-1500 kms.
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Hatf-6 Shaheen II 2300 kms.
Except for Ghauri which was adapted from the Nodong, all others appeared to be modified versions of Chinese missiles. An important issue that emerges is whether this linkage continues, as Shaheen II was tested only in March 2004.
Discussion
Given the availability of systemic factors, India should try and penetrate different constituencies in Pakistan, as its people were its best bet. New Delhi should encourage Pakistanis to visit India as they would go back as its unofficial ambassadors.
The hopes for an early solution to the Kashmir question were misplaced. There were many contradictions and several things happening in Pakistan that were weakening its democratic forces.
It was important for India to start working on its available options on Kashmir without losing the present momentum. Otherwise, the process could get derailed. Our best bets were trade and information technology. But, somehow the establishment was not confident in moving forward on these issues.
We have to engage Pakistan in realist terms; keep talking on Kashmir and try to find a solution, even in some distant future simultaneously along with an agreement on other issues.
Without assuaging the honour of the Pakistan Army it was difficult to settle any outstanding issues between the two countries. There was no self-critical examination by the Pak Army despite its losing four wars with India. It was doubtful whether the Army would ever allow a genuine peace constituency in Pakistan to flourish.
The basic strategy and perceptions of Pakistan have not changed; and this will remain. All these peace processes were over hyped.
Any change in the status quo on Kashmir should be to India's advantage. Any peace moves without Pakistan accepting its responsibility for the violence in Kashmir would be artificial.
The people on the Pakistani side of Kashmir were averse to jihad and fundamentalism.
On Kashmir, we should first try and put our own house in order. The dialogue between New Delhi and Srinagar was significant and necessary before embarking on a dialogue with Pakistan.
It was not realistic to look for solutions to Kashmir at this juncture. They would only emerge in due course.
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