Indo-Pak - Articles

Announcing a dozen proposals on October 22 relating to Pakistan, Vajpayee hinted that this would be his final attempt to normalize Indo-Pak relations. Since 1998, Vajpayee has made three significant efforts in this direction. The first was to go to Lahore and sign a declaration that stated the essentiality of the “resolution of all outstanding issues, including Jammu and Kashmir.”

In March 1999, Vajpayee took another bold step and decided to discuss Kashmir with Pakistan at the secret level. R K Mishra and Niaz Naik met as the emissaries of Vajpayee and Sharif and had five rounds of discussions on Kashmir before 17 May 1999. According to Niaz Naik, Vajpayee and Sharif agreed that they would focus on four issues: “Both sides should move beyond publicly stated positions on Kashmir. A solution to Kashmir must take into account the interests of India, Pakistan and above all the Kashmiri people. The solution to Kashmir must be just, fair and feasible. The agreed solution to Kashmir must be final and not partial.” (Robert G. Wirsing, Kashmir in the Shadow of War: Regional Rivalries in a Nuclear Age, 27). Undoubtedly, this was the boldest gesture by any Indian leader to resolve the Kashmir conflict.

It is generally believed that Kargil altered everything. Irrespective of what was happening in Kargil between May and July 1999, Vajpayee had other options to continue his efforts. Vajpayee failed to understand that Kargil was largely an adventure by Pakistan’s military, led by Musharraf. For once, George Fernandes was right when he said, “The Pakistan Army hatched a conspiracy to push in the infiltrators and the Nawaz Sharif government did not have a major role.” 

Sharif, by mid-June was looking for a way out, without damaging his standing with the military and the people of Pakistan. Meanwhile, Vajpayee revived the Mishra-Naik dialogue that had been stalled since 17 May 1999. R K Mishra, according to Niaz Naik reached Islamabad on 25 June to convey a stern message to Sharif. Sharif, already under pressure to find a way out, proposed a four-point formula to resolve the mess his military had created. The formula visualized that “Both prime ministers should reiterate their commitment to the Lahore process; both India and Pakistan should take concrete steps to restore the sanctity of the Line of Control; the Indian side should stop the shelling and aerial bombing in the Kargil sector in order to restore an atmosphere conducive to peace; and both prime ministers should renew efforts to complete the process started at Lahore to include resolution of all issues between them, including Jammu and Kashmir.”

Vajpayee invited Naik to New Delhi and discussed the four points with him on 27 June. Finally, it was agreed, that both the Prime Ministers would meet in New Delhi. The strategy was simple. Sharif, on his way to China, would send a message of ‘peace and good will’ to Vajpayee who would, in turn, invite him to New Delhi. Both would then agree on a statement. Though there is some controversy over what was to constitute this statement, it is believed that it included taking appropriate steps to respect the LoC; resume the composite dialogue process under the Lahore declaration; while Pakistan would use its influence over the mujahideens to persuade them to disengage.

Naik went back to Islamabad and Sharif waited for an agreed draft that both leaders could sign. Vajpayee had a great opportunity to bring an end to the war and revive the Lahore process. This would have provided the much-needed space for Sharif inside Pakistan, without undermining his position. In retrospect, seeing what happened to Sharif, democracy and Pakistan, it appears that Vajpayee missed a golden opportunity on 27 June 1999. Instead, he was swayed by the hawks around him, who preferred a military victory for political purposes.

Vajpayee got another chance in 2001, when Musharraf came to India.. He appeared sincere and obviously, came to discuss Kashmir.. Vajpayee was aware of his intentions and was also willing to take that extra step. It is believed that he agreed with Musharraf that “progress towards” settling Kashmir would promote normalization of relations and that both sides will resume a “sustained dialogue at the political level on Jammu and Kashmir.” It is believed that Musharraf was not asking for the settlement of the Kashmir dispute at Agra, but only “progress towards” settling it. Vajpayee agreed, and the draft was ready, but this was not acceptable to his party men in the cabinet.

Vajpayee could however,, have either gone ahead with Musharraf on initiating a dialogue on Kashmir or stood up to his colleagues and told them to either accept the draft or his resignation. The entire nation would have stood behind Vajpayee. Thus another chance was missed..

However, history seems to be kind to Vajpayee as he initiated another round of discussions.... But will he stand up and be counted when the going gets tough?  The new generation is looking towards you, Vajpayee. Give us something to move ahead with; even if it means losing your residence on Race Course road!