How do the Pakistanis see the Indian proposals and Pakistan’s response? The popular response could be broadly categorized into two – the moderates and cautionists, who would like to move forward; and the not so moderates, who consider the talks as an Indian trap.
The Moderates and the Cautionists
The News, in its editorial, “Indo-Pak tangle,†cautions (1 November 2003): “The prime intent of all Indian initiatives has been to exclude Kashmir and, thus, render it a non-issue. When that is untenable, the fallback ploy is to somehow sideline and postpone it. Pakistan’s response is then dictated inevitably by the desire not to let Kashmir slip either from the bilateral agenda or the international radar screens.†To a large extent, one could see this aspect of ‘marginalizing Kashmir; reflecting in every response, whether from moderates, or cautionists or the hawks.
Dr Moonis Ahmar finds four reasons on the proposals and counter proposals of India and Pakistan has not taken the practical shape. He feels (“Why this competition?,†The News, 4 November 2003) that “at the state level, both in New Delhi and in Islamabad, the stage has not come when their ego is not a factor in determining their position on soft and hard issues.â€Â; “too much wishful thinking and overconfident approach by India and Pakistan in presenting and rejecting proposals.â€Â; “in most cases, proposals submitted by India and Pakistan for reducing tension or promoting bilateral ties are for political and public relations consumption.â€Â: and finally, both sides tend to “belittle and undermine each other’s position..
The bus service was seen with a lot of interest. The editorial of The News, (“Indo-Pak tangle,†1 November 2003) viewed it as “the only politically sensitive part was the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service. Though sensible and innocuous in itself, it had raised Islamabad’s antennae because the Indians could use this cross-LoC traffic to invoke a formalisation of Kashmir’s partition and acceptance by Pakistan of the LoC as the border. Hence, Islamabad’s pre-condition of a UN involvement in monitoring the traffic and issuing travel documents.â€Â
Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema consider (“Meaningful steps or another game,†The News, 2 November 2003) that India should agree to bilateral guarantee on withdrawal of facilities on air links. He also writes “Trust will only come once the core dispute is subjected to a meaningful and sustained dialogue leading to a satisfactory resolution of the Kashmir dispute.â€Â
Mir Jamilur Rahman, feels (“Inching towards normalcy,†The News, 1 November 2003) that India should implement those CBMs unilaterally, since “it had demolished (them) unilaterally. India had not negotiated their demolition with Pakistan, then why should it need to negotiate their resurrection.†He makes two valid observations, the first on humanitarian support to children who are sick. He observes: “It would be advisable if the two governments leave this matter to the NGOs or the respective hospitals. The government involvement would only add red tape to a very laudable and humane cause. Second to encourage youth interaction, he suggests “the educational institutions of the two countries should open up their doors to each other’s young. In the long run it would prove the best and the most rewarding CBM that India and Pakistan could ever think of.â€Â
The Not so Moderates
Firoza Ahmed looking back (“Negotiating peace with India,†Dawn, 6 November 2003) into the history of “India's logic of using force to take over Junagarh and Manavadar states which had acceded to Pakistan, and the subsequent invasion of Hyderabad†as “facts that cannot be easily forgotten,†writes “he object of bringing home the harsh realities of history is not to rake up the past but to remind the wise men from across the border to refrain from pulling wool over the eyes of the reading public. Much has been said about forgetting the bitterness of the past and holding of negotiations with an open mind. That, we believe was the approach that was adopted at Agra and would perhaps be continued in future talks, whether on the sidelines of international or regional conferences or at meetings specifically called for peace and normalization.†However, he concludes, “even while we enter into negotiations with India with an open mind, we should not forget our past experience of negotiations with that country and also the compulsions under which India would feel impelled to come to the negotiating table.â€Â
Masud Akhtar Shaikh, (“Beware of the Indian game,†The News, 7 November 2003) consider that “the way Pakistan government has reacted to the latest set of Indian proposals craftily designated by India as confidence-building measures shows that we have taken the bait. One fails to understand what the big sense was in even looking at the proposals that do not mention anything about the core issue of Kashmir.â€Â
He asks: “How can Pakistan have confidence in a country that has been blatantly defying the UN Security Council resolutions on Kashmir for more than half a century and is still adamantly refusing to comply with those resolutions; a country that has deployed more than seven hundred thousand troops in the occupied state and has been ruthlessly killing our Kashmiri brethren for more than a decade; a country that has been developing Pakistan-specific weapons of mass destruction, thus forcing this country to get involved in a suicidal arms race that is bound to shatter its relatively weaker economy in the long run?
Inayatullah feels Pakistan should take a pro-active step (“People-to-people strategy,†The News, 4 November 2003) and feels the following should be Pakistan’s strategy: It should persuade India to “restore the level of the India-Pakistan relationship as it obtained before India, unilaterally, cut off the communication links and reduced the size of the embassy staffâ€Â; It should “seriously and vigorously strive for the strengthening of the UN Military Observers Group to effectively monitor the movements and the situation at the Line of Control; It should “raise hue and cry internationally formally and through the media and civil society organisations like the Amnesty International and the Asia Watch which have documented the atrocities being committed in the occupied state?â€Â: and it should “build up a strong case for the international community to agree to mediate or effectively facilitate the settlement of the issue and thus bring peace and normalisation to this nuclearised part of the world.â€Â
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