Indo-Pak - Articles

Unlike the Agra summit in 2001, General Musharraf's second visit in April 2005 to India witnessed a joint statement being arrived at. So much has happened since the Agra summit that makes the joint statement a special mile stone in the bilateral process.

At the outset, the differences between his two visits are so manifest. Unlike the previous time, General Musharraf came to India for a visit to watch cricket and not for a summit. There was not much publicity and media hype for his Delhi visit; hence there were less expectations and pressure on the leaders. Musharraf, as he himself noticed, is a changed man; he wanted to discuss Kashmir, but is not as obsessive as he was during the previous summit. More importantly, he met Manmohan Singh, who unlike Vajpayee, does not have an extremist and hawkish cabinet to scuttle any progress in Kashmir. Finally, Manmohan Singh, as a leader, seems to be courageous than his predecessor. Vajpayee always took the first step, but never was courageous enough to go further. Manmohan Singh seems willing to take the second step; he agreed to inaugurate the bus service to Muzaffarabad and he persisted with the same despite the terrorist attack; he invited Musharraf to watch cricket and did not hesitate to talk Kashmir and include the same in Joint Statement.

The Joint Statement assumes importance for the following. First, the joint statement emphasizes that the progress in peace process has been satisfactory and is irreversible. Second, both the leaders addressed the crucial (or the core, as Pakistan would prefer to call it) issue of Kashmir and work towards a final settlement. It is believed that General Musharraf was precisely looking for such an assurance to be reflected in the joint statement from Vajpayee during the Agra summit. While Vajpayee was willing to go along, hawkish elements in his cabinet did not want such an assurance in the joint statement. Vajpayee, lacking courage to carry further, let the process get scuttled. Manmohan Singh however took the second crucial step and needs to be congratulated for providing a new impetus for the peace process.

Third, the joint statement also condemns the terrorist attack on the bus service and ensures taking the peace process ahead irrespective of terrorist attacks. As could be seen from the recent events, a section amongst the various terrorist groups is totally independent and has been against the peace process. General Musharraf himself has been at the receiving end; assassination attempts on him would amplify his internal problems with the jihadis. These groups are a threat to both India and Pakistan and also to peace and stability in South Asia. India should insist with Pakistan that there are no good and bad terrorist groups and the phenomenon should be rooted out with sincerity.

Fourth, the joint statement mentions a series of measures that would ultimately result in improving people-to-people contacts. Reopening of the consulates in Karachi and Mumbai, the rail route between Munobao and Kokhrapar, and the bus route between Poonch and Rawalkot - all these measures are likely to improve people-to-people contacts. India could further unilaterally relax the visa regime. It is in India's interests that more Pakistanis visit India and realize the facts on ground. India could win over Pakistanis not by closing it for the later rather by opening and showing its strength. Opening of communication channels is a major achievement for India; this process needs to be strengthened. India should take unilateral measures, even if Pakistan is hesitating on this issue without expecting any reciprocity. As observed by Musharraf, India could be magnanimous, at least on those issues which would suit its interests. Opening up to Pakistanis is in India's interests.

Fifth, the joint statement also mentions about economic measures, especially on gas pipelines and reactivating Joint Economic Commission. Since the process started in October 2003, not much has been achieved on economic CBMs. Two factors hinder any real progress on building the economic CBMs. The government of Pakistan has been extremely reluctant to provide MFN status to India; and there are strong constituencies, especially in Pakistan which do not want trade relations with India, as they fear being overrun by the latter's goods. Unless these two 'core' factors are addressed, India and Pakistan may not be able to achieve much on the economic front. India alternatively could go ahead with the idea of importing gas through Pakistan; however it may not improve the economic relations unless broader questions of trade are addressed. Until then appointment of new economic councils or reactivating dead commissions would really not aid in improving the bilateral economic relations.

To conclude, the joint statement shows maturity from both Indian and Pakistani sides in terms of understanding each others sensitivities. Unlike Agra, the journey has not been halted in New Delhi. The road to peace is long, so would be the journey.