General Musharraf in January 2004 announced his willingness to set aside UN Security Council resolutions in order to reach an agreement on Kashmir with India. The UNSC resolutions primarily call for a plebiscite to determine the wishes of Kashmiri people. For long, Pakistan’s insistence on UNSC resolutions has been termed as its ‘principled stand’ on Kashmir. The UNSC resolutions also call for the removal of Pakistani troops from Kashmir followed by that of India.
Musharraf’s statements had raised both positive and negative responses within and without. While some see it as a ‘pragmatic approach’, others criticize as a ‘sell out’.
Kashmir and UN Resolution
Ghayoor Ahmed (“Flexibility on Kashmir,  Dawn, 8 January 2004) observed that General Musharraf's suggestion of setting aside the UN Security Council resolutions on Kashmir as ‘a pragmatic approach.’ This, Ghayoor feels, cannot be “construed an abandonment of the principle of the right of self-determination embodied in the UN Secretary Council resolutions on Kashmir.  Why should Pakistan stick to UN resolutions when UN itself has abdicated the same? “The resolutions of the UN Security Council on Kashmir will remain valid until they are either implemented or the Security Council, at the joint request of India and Pakistan, repeals or replaces them. 
Mir Jamilur Rehman (“New Questions, New Answers,  The News, 10 January 2004) makes interesting observation on Kashmir being called as Pakistan’s ‘jugular vein’. He asks:  If the plebiscite went against joining Pakistan, then should we go to war to claim our jugular vein? Conversely, Kashmir is as much a jugular vein of India as of Pakistan because rivers flowing from there also keep the Indian Punjab green. Would India accept the adverse plebiscite verdict and hand over its jugular vein to Pakistan? 
Is giving up UNSC resolutions is that simple and accepted by everyone inside Pakistan? It does not appear so. The Nation in its editorial (10 January 2004) commented: “The decision to drop our insistence on the resolutions’ implementation would have amounted to accepting New Delhi’s position; for it is hardly likely to agree to another mode of impartially eliciting the Kashmiris’ wishes.  The Nation also commented on the same issue in its editorial (13 January 2004) few days later: “Any perception to barter away the fate of Kashmiris would deeply hurt the sentiments of both Kashmiris and Pakistanis in the disputed state as well as Pakistan. The government’s fragile backing among the masses would be further eroded. The only solution acceptable is through the exercise of the right of self-determination under UN auspices; for there is no other conceivable way to ascertain the wishes of the people. A solution, inconsistent with their cherished hope, would not guarantee the enduring peace; leaders of both countries are looking for. 
Ali S Khan, Director of Kashmiri Scandinavian Council at Oslo made an observation (“Peace through UN Resolutions,  The Nation, 13 January 2004): “The Jammu and Kashmir dispute defines the very character of the United Nations. The Security Council employing all means at its disposal, namely, mediation, arbitration and preventive diplomacy reached conclusions on the basis of several resolutions, which define the modus operandi for the resolution of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute. Denial of these resolutions or any obfuscation to block their implementation would be tantamount to challenge the United Nations authority and to flouting the established norms of international law. 
Indo-Pak Rapprochement: Should they or Should they not?
Daily Times in its editorial (8 January 2004) commented on the Indo-Pak joint statement of 6 January 2004: “The Statement looks skewed in favor of Pakistan because what President Musharraf is seen to concede in it is only what has been Pakistan’s ‘legal’ position in the past. The Joint Statement may have subliminally acknowledged it as a significant gesture of reconciliation from the Pakistani side. Equally, India’s acceptance that the Jammu and Kashmir dispute will be settled to the satisfaction of both India and Pakistan is a great concession to the Pakistani negotiators. 
Nazim Zehra (“Why did it work at Islamabad,  The News, 8 January 2004) made two significant points on the differences between Lahore and Islamabad summits: “One: Pakistan’s military leadership as the principal interlocutor on the Pakistani side thereby reducing sabotage of the process from within. Two: Unlike Lahore where the focus of the pre-summit preparations was entirely on policy content, for Islamabad the pre-summit preparations factored in policy elements, policy articulation and policy projection. 
Inayatullah argued (“The Joint Statement and After,  The Nation, 13 January 2004): “To cope with the new ‘questions’ as Vajpayee put it and find satisfactory ‘answers’, there is an urgent need for (a) opening up a national debate inside the Parliament and outside in different form in all the provinces on the emerging issues, and (b) in-depth and intensive exercises on the part of the Foreign Office and other concerned governmental organizations to explore all possible options on various questions and to set priorities to achieve national objectives, and (c) engage both factions of the Hurriyyat and more than that, take steps to bring them together. 
Moonis Ahmar is correct in being cautious. He rightly said (“A Victory of moderates?," The News, 13 January 2004) “One thing which is a source of alarm in the realm of Indo-Pakistan relations is the question of unpredictability…Moderates of the two countries can only win if they are able to ensure rational outcome of normalization talks due to take place in the month of February. Most important, the silent majority of India and Pakistan, who were a hostage of extremist groups must assert their position for peace in the region and play an effective role for sustaining the process of dialogue between India and Pakistan. 
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