History teaches us, they say, that nations learn nothing from history; but nations, like individuals, can become prisoners of their own rhetoric. Can anything be learnt, however, from the earlier Indo-Pak Summits that were successful—
Tashkent
(1966), Simla (1972) and
Lahore
(1999) that could guide the Agra Summit meeting in mid-July?
There are two distinguishing aspects of the upcoming Agra Summit.
· Firstly, the lack of enthusiasm for the
Summit
and pessimism about its outcome is pervasive in both countries. This is based on past experience of Indo-Pak Summits and meetings that either yielded no results or led to agreements that were only honored in their breach.
· Secondly, there are no signs of any agenda or bilateral issues being finalized before the
Summit
. A serendipitous belief obtains that some back channel contacts must exist to inch the two protagonists forwards. Another hope is that the two leaders would develop a personal chemistry between themselves, and the bureaucrats could then hammer out their decisions into agreements.
Holding a
Summit
to have talks about talks or for cosmetic reasons is wholly feckless. So, what could be the agenda?
Kashmir
cannot obviously be ignored. Reiteration, however, of long-held positions i.e.
India
has nothing to discuss since
Kashmir
had legally acceded to
India
in 1947, or that
Pakistan
is committed to a plebiscite being held in accordance with ancient U.N. resolutions will only ensure that the debate remains circular. The only viable solution is to convert the Line of Control into an international border (either now or after a period of time), grant fuller autonomy to the Kashmiris on both sides, and soften the border between the new Kashmiri states. Is it possible for
India
and
Pakistan
to bite this bullet?
Apart from Kashmir, the knee jerk reaction by the leaders could be to revive the abandoned Foreign Secretary level talks to discuss their eight-point agenda, which includes Kashmir, peace and security, Siachen, Wular barrage, Sir Creek, terrorism and drug trafficking, trade and commerce, and promotion of friendly exchanges. An epochal decision possible in
Agra
would be to establish an institutional framework for the official dialogue; thereby a mechanism would be created to ensure permanence for this dialogue process. More ambitiously, the
Tashkent
, Simla and
Lahore
agreements could be explored to see which of their provisions could be pursued in
Agra
. The most obvious are the earlier agreements to prevent and discourage hostile propaganda directed against each other; adhere by the principle of non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; promote easier travel between the two countries by easing their restrictive visa policy; increasing the number of buses and railway trains between Lahore and Amrita, and connecting Muzaffarabad with Srinagar, and Munabao (Rajasthan) with Tharparkar (Sindh). The Consulates in Mumbai and
Karachi
could be reopened to facilitate an enlightened visa policy.
Some lessons are available, both positive and negative, from these earlier
Summit
meetings.
Tashkent
was brokered by the erstwhile
Soviet Union
; a third country thus played a mediator role, which was extremely helpful.
India
’s aversion to third party intervention is not grounded therefore in the historical narrative. President Musharraf has recently revealed that the
Agra
meeting came about due to American ‘encouragement’, which must be presumed to be operating in the shadows. The Simla Summit also provides some interesting sidelights into process. It was preceded by the Murree talks between official-level delegations led by P.N. Haksar and Aziz Ahmed that laid out the agenda for the
Summit
and substantively agreed upon the contours of the Agreement ultimately signed. There is still some time available for this modality being pursued before the Agra Summit. The other lesson available from the Simla meeting is that confidential understandings do not work in
South Asia
, and certainly not about sensitive issues like
Kashmir
. Whether or not Indira Gandhi and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto reached an understanding on converting the Line of Control into an international border in Simla is still a controversial issue. Hence, any agreements reached in
Agra
should be concretized and not left to personal ‘understandings’. The Lahore Summit, for its part, established that reaching agreements with
Pakistan
does not imply that
India
should lower its guard. This elementary principle of international relations must be kept in mind, lest Kargil occur again.
Ruminating on these lessons of the earlier Summits would be a more useful exercise than issuing dire statements and reacting to similar fulmination from the other side. Dependence on chemistry to work between a seasoned political leader and the leader of a military coup would be placing too much faith in just plain luck. Hopefully, the Agra Summit will not join the long list of past Indo-Pak engagements that ended on the dust heap of their tangled history.
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