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#1718, 27 April 2005
 
Can Musharraf be Trusted? - Engage Him Until a Better Option Arises
D Suba Chandran
Assistant Director, IPCS
 

Should India trust Musharraf to deal with Pakistan? If he is not trustworthy, should India stop dealing with him? For India there are major security interests in Pakistan: a peace process that could be sustained; an understanding on Kashmir to keep cross border terrorism below the threshold, if not total elimination; and a stable and secular Pakistan. If General Musharraf could deliver India on these three counts, it would be in India's interests to engage him. The question that India needs to address is whether he is the best bet given the present political and military situation in Pakistan.

Is there any other institution or individual that could support and provide stability to the bilateral peace process? Unfortunately, neither the political parties nor its leaders in Pakistan instill confidence. Neither Benazir Bhutto nor Nawaz Sharif can be counted upon, as they have been thoroughly discredited by the people. They may be easier to deal with from an Indian perspective, but would they be able to deliver? Given the internal power dynamics between the various institutions, the Prime Minister cannot act on his own independent of military's influence. Worse, if the people or even a section opposes it, the political leadership would not be able to act decisively. The unfortunate fact is that only Gen Musharraf can convey and impose an understanding in Pakistan agreed upon with India. Could any political leadership have taken U-turn on Pakistan's Afghan policy after September 11 and survived it?

The political leadership in Pakistan is weak and would remain so in the near term future. General Musharraf may not be a champion of Indo-Pak peace, but he is the only person who can implement what has been agreed upon at bilateral levels. Nawaz Sharif, despite his massive majority in the Parliament after the 1997 elections was unable to carry forward the Lahore process. Musharraf and the military were responsible for initiating the Kargil conflict; but he has proved that no political leadership, however powerful it might be inside Parliament, could carry out an Indo-Pak peace process without its approval. If this is a reality, then it would be in India's interests to engage the military directly; if General Musharraf controls it today, India should engage him.

Second, General Musharraf assumes importance on the Jammu and Kashmir issue for two reasons. He remains the only leader who had the courage to acknowledge that the UN resolutions are irrelevant; and that a soft border could be considered as a temporary solution. No other political leader could have made such statements and escaped public wrath, especially from the Islamic Right in Pakistan and the militant groups. Musharraf has been proposing various formulae and is willing to initiate a process to resolve the Kashmir conflict, thus not insisting on an immediate or time bound solution. The fact that he has advocated so many options would reveal his willingness to compromise. It would be in India's interest to engage with a leader having a flexible mind willing to explore what would be acceptable to both sides. Besides this, he would be the only person who can keep the cross border terrorism under control. He may never completely stop cross border terrorism, as it would remain his trump card to engage India. However, he may keep it under a threshold. He is aware that India may not negotiate if there is no militancy or if its level goes beyond India's threshold level. It would be in India's interests to keep the militancy under threshold so that it could initiate a process between New Delhi and Srinagar; and complete fencing the LoC.

Third, it is again unfortunate that Musharraf seems to be the only person who could provide stability or semblance of it to Pakistan, at least for the next few years. There is no institutional challenge - either from the political parties or the judiciary to the military's control. Civil society may not like the military's political rule, but it is unprepared to welcome a political dispensation led by either Benazir Bhutto or Nawaz Sharif. The religious parties may have street power, but can not provide a stable Pakistan. A jihadi and sectarian backlash is gaining momentum and needs to be controlled militarily. The challenges facing Pakistan's internal security are immense, but none of the political leaders instill confidence. It is clear the political leadership would not have the courage to act against either Osama bin Laden or A Q Khan.

To conclude, General Musharraf may not be the right person, but he is India's best bet in Pakistan. Until another leader - secular, military or religious - emerges in Pakistan, it would be in India's interest to engage Musharraf. Whether trustworthy or not, he is the only person who could deliver on the peace process and the Kashmir issue. Don't trust him; but deal with him.

 
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