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Ceasefire Sine Die?

The ceasefire between the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) and the Government of India was extended sine die on 31 July 2007. The truce in Nagaland has been extended every 12 months since 1997, except in 2005, when it was renewed for just six months at the insistence of the rebels and further prolonged by an additional six months in February 2006. Last year, on 31 July 2006, it was endorsed for another 12 months to boost the peace process. Ending speculation on both sides, 31 July this year provided a fresh lease of life to the ceasefire. This was a natural outcome, for in the decade gone by, peace ushered in by the ceasefire, though flawed, had become a powerful vested interest for all. However, threats aimed at making the opponent cower in order to alleviate their respective adamant stances continue to exist.

In the joint statement issued by the Centre's key interlocutor, K Padmanabhiah, and the NSCN (IM) General Secretary, T Muivah, "...it was decided to extend the truce indefinitely from 1 August, subject to the progress of talks." Reinforcing the ceasefire monitoring mechanism and adopting the Spanish government model of talking to the Basque separatists may be the NSCN (IM) leadership's ploy to simply play to the Naga gallery. According to a status paper issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) recently, there has been no significant reduction in civilian and military casualties in Nagaland in the year gone by. However, inter-factional clashes - the NSCN (Khaplang) offensive against NSCN (IM) - have resulted in militant fatalities in both the groups. The Nagaland government has been asked by the MHA to prepare an Action Plan to tackle this growing inter-factional rivalry.

A lot of animosity has been created between the Nagas and the Meities in the Imphal valley, an offshoot of the Centre's ambivalence. Former Prime Minister, IK Gujral, brokered the armistice and within months of the truce, Naga-inhabited areas of Manipur bore the brunt of violence. For New Delhi it has been a carrot and stick policy - both the NSCN factions have been asked to go back to their camps. The bottom line is it may be better to stagnate in peace than in hostility.

The NSCN (IM) softened its rigid stance and realized that the Centre has to abide by the Indian Constitution at any cost and talks in Dimapur, unlike the previous ones in Amsterdam or Bangkok, are a pointer in that direction. Though a decade of negotiation has not brought about any tangible result, the NSCN (IM) hardliners are not complaining because they also realize that 50 years of armed rebellion has not delivered any result either. Semantically, it was a ceasefire between two equal parties; in reality, however, it was never so. In the peace breakthrough, the Indian interlocutors, first Swaraj Kaushal and then Padmanabhiah have always had an upper hand by gerrymandering, which was lost on Muivah and Isac Swu caught in the euphoria. The Government of India was the benefactor, giving the insurgent organization another chance to reform, or an honourable exit. If this was not so, the preconditions of the ceasefire would not have been about setting up designated camps for the insurgents.

Unlike the Mizo National Front, whose rebel leader Laldenga eventually formed the government in 1986 after a ceasefire, in the case of the NSCN (IM), the ceasefire has been politically unproductive. Despite the braggadocio, they have not been able to topple any democratically elected government in Kohima. The implicit basis always was, and still is, that settlement ultimately reached has to be within the Indian Constitution, or within acceptable limits of amendment to the Constitution. If the NSCN (IM) or any bellicose group chooses to negotiate peace with the belief that anything beyond this is achievable, then they should be prepared for years of futile negotiations. This puts the ordinary citizens in total misery as they are berated by opposing laws, different extortion regimes and are expected to be loyal to the two powers for the fear of being castigated either for betraying the nation, or being a traitor.

During earlier talks, the NSCN (IM) had proposed two seemingly impossible propositions - 'a special federal arrangement' and a separate constitution under the arrangement. The Government of India had serious objections to both the demands for it was not in favour of redrawing the boundaries of Northeast India for the territorial unification of Nagaland. Ultimately the legendary Naga rebel leader Phizo accepted the Indian Constitution. At present, New Delhi expects an ageing Isac Swu-Muivah and Khaplang to fall in line by extending the cessation of hostilities, if not now, maybe in another ten years. But history repeats itself. There is no assurance that another group owing allegiance to the NSCN (IM) will not break away and carry on their struggle as Isac Swu-Muivah had done when the Naga National Council signed the Shillong accord with Indira Gandhi in 1975.