This has become a much-overworked phrase in the context of Indo-US relations. Ambassador Pickering is believed to have launched a "strategic dialogue" with
India
during his recent visit. Karl Inderfurth, Assistant Secretary of State, in his testimony, has described this before the House International Relations Subcommittee on the
Near East
and
South Asia
as being designed "to insure [sic] regular, high level, comprehensive and forward-looking exchanges on a wide range of issues".
The Americans have been at considerable pains to explain what "strategic dialogue" does not mean. Evidently, this phrase cannot be extended to suggest a "strategic relationship" or "strategic partnership". So, the
US
intention is to have an engagement with
India
that is "less formal" but "quite important" and better understand each other with a view "to strengthen the international order and to increase peace and stability in the region". [All these quotes are from a background briefing provided by the State Department before the
Pickering
visit.
What's the American stake?
Why are the Americans so sensitive about what their strategic dialogue with
India
means and does not mean? A reasonable surmise would be their desire to distance themselves from the recommendation made in the prestigious Council on Foreign Relations Report suggesting that the
United States
should forge "a closer strategic relationship" with
India
. In essence:
"The relationship would be based on shared values and institutions, economic collaboration including enhanced trade and investment, and the goal of regional stability across
Asia
. Consistent with these interests, the Task Force recommends that the United States adopt a declaratory policy that acknowledges India's growing power and importance; maintain high-level attention including regular reciprocal visits of cabinet members and senior officials; loosen unilateral US constraints upon the transfer of dual-use technologies; increase military-to-military cooperation; cooperate on elements of India's civilian nuclear program and other energy-related issues; and undertake limited conventional arms sales. The
United States
should also support
India
's entry into Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation..."
The use of the phrase "strategic partnership" and the extensive nature of its ambit, as described by the Task Force, drew more than its fair share of criticism, especially from Pakistan and elements in the Clinton Administration that have traditionally favoured its interests. The connotation of a "partnership", moreover, had an anti-China flavour. Current
US
policy towards
China
, oscillating between engagement and competitiveness, has been carefully constructed. Any suggestion that the
United States
wants to develop a "strategic partnership" with
India
would upset that policy. Hence the emphasis on dialogue, to discern
India
's own perceptions of the post-Cold-War world and how it assesses its relations with
China
in the short and long terms.
Implications for
India
It is therefore important for
India
to develop its understanding on these issues, proceeding beyond the banal declarations that: Sino-Indian relations are improving but its nuclear-missile-conventional arms transfers to
Pakistan
greatly affect
India
's national security. Optimism about Sino-Indian relations must be tinged with caution. In the assessable future, however, the
United States
would continue to be the only superpower in a unipolar world. However,
China
is fast emerging as the revisionist power to challenge the
United States
.
What are the options before
India
in this milieu? Clearly, the most independent option would be to remain unaligned in the contention between
China
and the
United States
. Will this be possible? And what will be its implications? Or should
India
join the group of developed nations comprising
Japan
, the EU and the
United States
. Or join a combination of Asian-Eurasian powers that might emerge, comprising
China
and
Russia
. So much is certain: whatever option is chosen by
India
, its viability would depend on
India
's internal stability/cohesiveness and the achievement of a sustainable and respectable (8%) rate of economic growth. That would require steady progress of economic reforms which, in turn, would require the maintenance of financial discipline that weak coalition governments find difficult. In that sense, how
India
manages the political transition from single-party to multi-party coalition rule will decide its place in the post-Cold-War world. And the viability of whatever option it chooses.
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