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The two-day Annual Foreign Office Consultation between India and Bangladesh concluded on 17 July 2008, in New Delhi. In the press conference following the consultation, both foreign secretaries expressed their satisfaction with the talks that addressed increased agricultural and scientific cooperation, while sidestepping the major issues of transit and terrorism.

Unfortunately, the conclusion of the consultation sounded incredibly similar in tone and content to the decisions taken in the last consultation held in July 2007. The lack of any progress on pertinent issues in Indo-Bangladesh relations seems to be a clear indicator that the Bangladeshi position on Indian affairs seems unchanged even under the regime of the current Caretaker Government (CTG). The enthusiasm with which New Delhi had welcomed the CTG last year, with the hope of finding a fair partner across the negotiating table, has cooled off since. But was it reasonable for India to expect the CTG to be more receptive to her offers than past governments?

The military-backed CTG, when it arrived on the scene in January 2007, seemed a much more liberal and forward-looking actor in Bangladeshi politics than the previous democratically-elected governments. However, the recent foreign office consultation, one of the series of such high-level visits between the two countries over the past one and a half years, has not resulted in any concrete decisions. It should be noted that even the CTG is unlikely to aggressively court pro-India feelings, since it might provide ammunition to the political parties to undo what the CTG has achieved in the past one and half years.

Currently, the Bangladeshi government is under a lot of pressure from within, largely due to its anti-graft campaign and suspension of civil rights in the country. A large part of the population in Bangladesh is still not convinced that the two former prime ministers, Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina, whom the government had arrested on corruption charges, are guilty. Under these circumstances, it is unlikely that the CTG would be too eager to publicly take a pro-India stance, as it might bring its credibility into question.

Nevertheless, the CTG was and remains India's best bet in pushing for greater Indian presence on Bangladeshi soil. It is likely that in the elections that the CTG has promised by the end of 2008, the old political trend will continue. Whichever party forms the government, whether the Awami League or BNP; it will be forced to form a coalition with minor parties; usually Islamists for the BNP and extreme leftists for the Awami League. As a result, Delhi will be back to dealing with a weak government which will be unable to take a pro-India stance due to pressure from its coalition partners.

The military-backed CTG, on the other hand, will be the prefect partner to deal with, since it is not burdened with political patronage. Therefore, Delhi should have used the time since January 2007, when the CTG assumed power, to strengthen ties with Bangladesh and take the bilateral relations along an "irreversible higher trajectory." New Delhi must understand that given the political environment in Dhaka, it is unlikely that India will ever be invited in. India will have to force its foot through the door. Clearly, India needs to adopt a more aggressive diplomatic policy towards Bangladesh.

Many analysts agree that most of the current economic proposals made by India that have been rebuffed by Dhaka, were in fact in favour of Bangladesh. These include TATA's proposal to invest US$3 billion in Bangladesh, India-Bangladesh Free Trade Agreement (FTA,) and Indian use of Chittagong port. Even the former director of transportation at the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, M Rahmatullah, stated that for Bangladesh, avoiding India is "illogical."

It is apparent that most of these refusals have more to do with Dhaka's domestic political constraints rather than national interests. Hence, the CTG, not bogged down by political ideologies of minor government partners, can pursue a deal with India in Bangladesh's economic and national interest. Only, India needs to sell the deal harder. It is clear that for India to gain more influence over Bangladesh, in order to resolve various security and transit issues that it faces, it must increase its economic presence in Bangladesh. Consistent with the trend, since 2006, after a monopoly in Bangladeshi markets since 1989, India has slipped to second place in the list of largest Bangladeshi trading partners, after China. Only when India creates an extensive, mutually-agreeable and interdependent economic relationship with Bangladesh, will it manage to quell the largely anti-India feeling within the Bangladeshi population.