India & the world - Articles

Recognizing the importance of the subject, the Chair emphasised the need to educate ourselves about the developments in our neighbourhood.

P Sahadevan

The present political development is significant. Though there is nothing new in substance, the present crises differ from the earlier ones in two aspects:

·         The emergence of Constitution as a source of instability; and

·         The linkage between political stability and peace process.

Though Sri Lanka is a vibrant democracy, vindictive politics is not new to the Island. The present Constitution is a highly centralised one with the President at the apex; legislature and judiciary are marginalized and there is no concept of ‘checks and balances’. In this backdrop, President’s November 4 move of taking over of three ministries and prorogation of Parliament were constitutionally right, but politically wrong for two reasons:

·         It was ill timed. The Peace process was at a crucial stage with the submission of the counter-proposals by the LTTE. Moreover, it was done when the Prime Minister was out of the Island making her move appear as a coup.

·         The reasons given for the move were unconvincing. It was a desperate act and not out of national security consideration. The rationale was purely political.

The President’s stand since then has also been inconsistent. Initially she dubbed the present peace process as a major threat to national security. But later she offered her continued support to the process. Similarly, after initially questioning the legality of the ceasefire agreement (CFA) between the LTTE and the UNF government she directed the armed forces to respect the CFA. The stand on the LTTE counter-proposals was also paradoxicalâ€â€�“threat to sovereignty” followed by “basis for negotiations”. The legitimacy of the SLMM also met the same fate.

The main reason behind the “constitutional coup” was her feeling of being marginalized from the peace process. So she wanted to assert her constitutional authority at an appropriate time. She also expected a division in the floor especially within the UNF to form a government under her party, the People’s Alliance. But this did not work. It is not correct on the part of the President to think that Ranil is selling out the security of the country. The Prime Minister is being pragmatic; security of the country is also in his mind. Formation of a national government has both positive and negative aspects. While giving broader participation, such a government might lead to more differences than consensus.

At this juncture, it is better for India to involve in proactive facilitation rather than proactive direct involvement. India could try and bring the two leaders together to arrive at a amicable working mechanism of cohabitation.

MR Narayan Swamy

It is difficult to understand LTTE’s psyche. The proposals submitted by them are a stepping stone to separation. Various provisions in the proposals challenge Sri Lanka’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. By this, the Tigers have stepped out of the basic parameters of negotiations. However, Chandrika’s ill-timed and immature political actions on November 4 have shifted the focus. There was no attempt to debate and understand the counter-proposals from the Tigers. The militant group now points out that it was because of the lack of southern consensus that a viable and just solution to the ethnic issue remains evasive for many decades.

It is difficult to agree with the Norwegians that the LTTE is deeply wedded to peace. But the fact is all weddings were temporary ending in bloody divorce. For the LTTE, peace process is only a means to achieve a separate Eelam. It has gone through various layers of peace and the present one is nothing unique. Peace process gives them enough legitimacy and strengthens its ability as the present ceasefire agreement has provided. The agreement between Prabhaharan and Ranil Wickremasinghe was like the one between Mao Tse-tung and Chiang Kai-Shek during Chinese struggle against the Japanese. It will imminently fall. At no point of time the LTTE would agree for anything less than separation.

Maj Gen Dipankar Banerjee

The present crisis is akin to war, but a political one between Ranil Wickremasinghe and Chandrika Kumaratunga. It has arisen as a result of comedy of errors and also has elements of Greek tragedy. Sinhalese have never accepted the genuine grievances of the Tamils. Instead the LTTE was stamped as a terrorist organisation. A military solution was tried by various Sinhalese regimes but failed every time. The main reason for the military debacle is because of the ineffectiveness of the Sri Lankan armed forces rather than due to efficacy of the Tigers. The desertion rate in the Army is one of the highest. Chandrika failed to realise this and as a consequence lost the first round.

If peace is the end process, what the UNF government had been trying was to create conditions that would be conducive for the beginning of the end process. The LTTE counter-proposals are in substance similar to Thimphu proposals submitted by the Tamil militant groups in 1985. The proposals are maximalist; yet, the Tigers are willing to negotiate. However, they will not talk to Chandrika Kumaratunga if she takes charge of the peace talks. The option of Chandrika and Ranil coming together through a national government is unrealistic. Mid-term election is not a good option given the poor economic condition of the country. The present constitutional impasse needs to be broken before any moves to address the ethnic question.  Peace process is in a state of coma with the doctors having run away.

Discussion

The following observations were made during the discussions that followed the panel presentations:

• Solutions to the Ethnic Crisis

The thinking within the armed forces of Sri Lanka is that Chandrika is the best bet and India has to be involved in resolving the ethnic crisis. It is unfortunate that regimes in Colombo could not take into account moderate Tamil voices; it responds only to violence and terror. The Sri Lankan political culture has evolved in a confrontationist manner. So, the need of the hour is statesmanship among the Sinhalese leadership. Ranil’s agenda is not settlement, but to show himself as a ‘peace man’. Thirteenth Amendment based on the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord is still alive, but it has only nominal structure.  In the changed circumstances, its implementation could not solve the issue.

• The LTTE Factor

Tigers’ strategy is not Eelam; it wants to expose the problems within the Sinhala polity so as to use it to its maximum advantage. Tigers have their own drawbacks in pursuing separatism. India and Tamil Nadu have become unfriendly. The international environment is not conducive as before and the outfit has faced near exhaustion.

• India’s Options

India should be clear on what type of help and how it should be delivered to Sri Lanka. Otherwise misperceptions might emerge in case of defence cooperation. India still has its strategic interests in the island. But it has tried everything in vain. Currently New Delhi has to be pragmatic and cautious. Both the LTTE and Sri Lankan governments are not sincere vis-à-vis India. They would like it to use New Delhi.

• Impact of 9/11

September 11 did not make much difference in the Sri Lankan case. The LTTE continue to indulge in assassinations and they refused to attend the donors’ conference in Tokyo despite international pressure. But that 9/11 actuated the peace process is also an undeniable fact.