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#3400, 10 June 2011
 
Resurrecting the Sino-Indian Defence Dialogue
Bhartendu Kumar Singh
Indian Defence Accounts Service
email: bhartendukumarsingh@gmail.com
 

Sino-Indian relations have not been in the best of forms in recent times. While the two countries have enjoyed ‘relative peace’ on their Line of Actual Control (LAC), persistent cases of Chinese trespassing on the LAC and other irritants have led to increased scepticism on resolution of long standing problems. An instance of the fall out between the two countries was the defence dialogue being put on hold since July 2010 when Beijing denied a proper stamped passport visa to a senior Indian Army Commander posted in Jammu and Kashmir. The resultant impasse led to difficulties for India to engage China in any form of military diplomacy. But is there a change now? 

Indian Defence Minister recently announced that India and China will soon resume the defence dialogue, a proposition strengthened by concurrent feelers from Beijing. Accordingly, the two sides will meet for their fourth round of defence dialogue, resuming a confidence building process that was initiated in 2007. Apparently, the differences were over the procedures of issuing visa which Prime Minister Manmohan Singh highlighted this anomaly in his meetings with the Chinese leaders. Beijing has not issued a single ‘stapled’ visa to India’s Jammu and Kashmir residents since Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s New Delhi visit last December. 

The defence dialogue is just one component of the comprehensive military diplomacy institutionalized between the two countries over a period of time. While the sector commanders’ meet on the LAC has kept pace, the joint military exercises (known as ‘hand-in-hand exercises) are yet to get another lease of life. These exercises, even though limited to only 100 odd soldiers from both sides, have allowed the two militaries to bridge the knowledge gap about each other and their behavioural pattern. Reviving this exercise would be a logical corollary to the recent initiative.

There are compelling reasons why the military on both sides need to explore, expand and institutionalize every opportunity for constructive engagement. First, there seems to be no scope for an agreement on clarification of the LAC in foreseeable future, forget the resolution of the vexed border problem between the two countries. While China has consolidated its strategic reach near the LAC (that include as many as five airfields, 58,000 kms of roads, and further extension of Qinghai Tibet Railway to Xigaze), India has woken up rather late in taking an initiative on the same. Either way, any kind of communication gap or misunderstanding could escalate the chances of a mishap on the LAC. Sustained investments in military diplomacy may help avoid this.

Second, Chinese military modernization and its expanding power projection have strengthened the conventional wisdom in India about China being a long term threat. Concurrently, the futility of constructive engagement has brought home the point that the country needs to follow a twin policy of military modernization and military diplomacy to manage relations with China and prevent it from dictating terms on border resolution and other issues. Third, there are areas where China and India may have to cooperate and work together since the costs of ‘not cooperating’ would be inimical to interests of both the parties. The anti-piracy activity in the Gulf of Aden is one such example. 

While the present development in military diplomacy has been initiated from both sides, India needs to walk an extra mile for several reasons. While China has moved ahead in military modernization and power projection; India remains a laggard despite being the largest arms importer in the world. Eventually, India may find it difficult to bridge the ‘power gap’ with China. Military diplomacy provides a cost - effective tool to manage threat perceptions from China. Moreover, unlike China where the PLA enjoys sizeable clout in foreign policy decision-making, the influence of the armed forces is quite under check in India due to bureaucratic-political counterbalancing and a liberal democratic political set-up. Palpably, China is a proclaimed leader in the art of military diplomacy. In the last few decades, the PLA has engaged a number of countries in different forms of military diplomacy which has yielded rich dividends. India should also expand its basket of military diplomacy and reach out to new countries. 

The concurrent rise of China and India has led to a situation where the two militaries are increasingly competing for power and influence. While China has often been criticized in past for indulging in aggressive strategic behaviour towards its neighbours, India’s ‘strategic restraint’ towards other countries under all circumstances has been widely appreciated. If China and India resort to competitive politics, either discreetly or through open arms competition, it will only distract the two countries from their primary task of economic development. On the contrary, using diplomatic mechanisms would help the two militaries to do away with misperceptions, explore cooperative ventures and avoid open confrontation.

The views expressed in this article are personal and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Government of India.

 
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