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#1507, 26 September 2004

Hu Jintao's New Uniform: What's the Message for Taiwan?

Jabin T Jacob
National Chengchi University Taipei, Taiwan

At the recently concluded session of the fourth plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC), Jiang Zemin proposed that Hu Jintao take over the Central Military Commission CMC) chairmanship from him, saying that the latter was "absolutely qualified for this post." Perhaps so, but not many, including the Taiwanese, expected Jiang to quit as suddenly as he did. While references have been made to the fact that Deng Xiaoping too quit his post as chairman of the CMC about two years after leaving the Politburo Standing Committee, the widespread impression was that Jiang intended to hang onto the post for a long time to come, having made several key promotions in the recent past.

Jiang and Hu had increasingly begun to differ on certain key issues. While Jiang's "Three Represents" theory appeared to have been slowly ignored by Hu, the latter's "Peaceful Rise" theory for China in world affairs was opposed by Jiang on the ground that it was not strong enough on Taiwan, and was seen as increasingly pressing toward independence. At the first meeting of the new CMC, Jiang stressed that reunification was a major political objective for China and asked the new leadership not to commit itself to giving up the use of force.

The Taiwanese press in its reports of the leadership change and the murmurings of a power struggle preceding it, showcased a range of opinions from the strictly neutral, to the hopeful, to the wary. Some quarters pointed to the gradual democratization in China, associated with the increasing numbers of people going online and examples of increasingly outspoken press, hoping that perhaps China would learn from Taiwan, the lessons of greater democracy and political freedoms for its people. However in a speech delivered in mid-September, Hu Jintao noted that "copying western political systems" would be a "blind alley" for China. The Taiwanese president, Chen Shui-bian, was therefore, foremost in expressing caution over the change in China, saying that Taiwan could not "harbour fantasies or have unrealistic expectations."

There were even opinions that Hu could adopt a harder line than Jiang on practicing the `one China' policy. While on the face of it, this does not appear to square with the "peaceful rise" concept mooted under Hu's leadership, Taiwan has always been an exception to every rule in China's book. As Chen warned, China had already expressed its intention to enact a unification law that would define Taiwan as a special political region under its jurisdiction, ostensibly allowing for a legal war to retake the territory.

While noting that Jiang lacked the clout that allowed Deng to pull the strings even after he had left the CMC, there was speculation in the Taiwanese press nevertheless, that a coterie of Jiang's supporters led by Vice President, Zeng Qinghong, could still hamstring Hu's functioning, despite Zeng not having made it to the CMC himself. But factional fights aside, the Taiwanese do not expect any major policy shifts following the change in the military leadership of China. Noting that Taiwan was an emotional issue for China and a political tool, one Taiwanese commentator laid stress on Taiwan's continuing ability "to handle cross-straits relations skillfully."

However, this is an ability that Hu would require in no less measure. While the majority in Taiwan still prefers the status quo with respect to cross-Straits relations, the increasingly fractious political debate and party politics in the island appear to be pushing it toward resolving any ambiguities on the matter. Indeed, there is reason enough to believe that the Taiwanese will increasingly and clearly state that political union with China is out of the question. And given the timing of Chen Shui-bian's plans for rewriting the Taiwanese constitution, in the run-up to the Olympic Games in Beijing in 2008, if China's actions have to match its rhetoric, Hu's options are frighteningly limited to military ones.

Is conflict then inevitable? Hu has a fairly long tenure ahead of him in the normal course of things and a fairly full plate of problems for him to deal within the mainland itself. He has shown no signs of wanting to give up one-party rule, preferring instead, for the CPC to rejuvenate itself to perform its task of governing the country better. It is anybody's guess which way the dice will roll on the Taiwan issue if the island persists in going its own way. But assuming that China will eschew a military option, no matter the rhetoric, Hu will have to, beginning now, find ways to work around the weight of years of indoctrination that has gone into the Chinese thinking on Taiwan. And clearly, the situation has gone beyond the "one country, two systems" approach, in which the Taiwanese have little faith left, following the experience of Hong Kong. In the increasingly confused lexicon bequeathed to Communist China by its departing leaders, Hu Jintao will have to come with his own creative "Thoughts" to resolve the Taiwan question

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