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Has India's Military Diplomacy Come of Age?

The Sino-Indian 'Hand-in-Hand 2008' military exercise that concluded recently at Belgaum in Karnataka may have hit headlines, but is no revelation to those who have observed India's military diplomacy in recent times. China apart, India has engaged many countries this year alone, under the rubric of military diplomacy. While the Navy led the show, with many bilateral and multilateral exercises, the Air Force and the Army too engaged themselves in significant joint exercises. This new found confidence and proliferation in India's military diplomacy leads to the question if India's military diplomacy has come of age.

The credit for new military diplomacy goes to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who introduced new political perspectives, seeking a commensurate military role for India in Asian international relations, in keeping with its rising economic and political profile. As the Minster of State for Defence Pallam Raju said at this year's Shangri La Dialogue in Singapore, "one of the long-term challenges for India was its willingness and ability to contribute to public good." Hence, in the past few years, India has entered into defence cooperation agreements with most great powers, including China, as also with smaller countries like Malaysia and Singapore, and even Mauritius. The Manmohan Singh doctrine has also been backed by the strategic consensus, in tackling common security threats through cooperative security along with other countries. Indian strategic thinkers have been quick to realise the potential of the cooperative security mechanisms, that offer cost effective security and a win-win scenario for every country, through a non-zero sum game approach.

The tangible gains are already visible. First, military diplomacy has helped in reducing tensions with China and allowed the two countries to explore the potentialities of a partnership in the emerging Asian security architecture. One can raise the issue of Pakistan, but that country is yet to acknowledge the utility of military diplomacy. Second, it has allowed India to share its own experience and knowledge with other countries and learn from their experiences. Witness for example, this year's inaugural Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) gathering at New Delhi, which allowed the Indian Navy different perspectives on contemporary maritime security. Third, it has enabled India to ensure enhanced policing of the adjacent waters in the Indian Ocean region, through sharing of intelligence with other countries. India's capability to curb piracy and other subversive activities in the region has definitely increased as witnessed in the recent sinking of pirate ships in the Gulf of Aden by the Indian Navy. Fourth, it has allowed India to maintain a peaceful periphery and project its power in a discreet and subtle manner, that empathies with the maritime needs and aspirations of small littoral countries in the region.

India's military diplomacy is, however, not a fairy tale story. First, the basket of military diplomacy is still limited to a few countries, as also limited in numbers. While India's late start is certainly responsible for that, there has also been some domestic ideological opposition to military exchanges with countries like the US. Often, they fail to factor in strategic advantages that accrue from such collaboration. Second, India is not able to harness military diplomacy due to the demand-supply disequilibrium with military modernisation. While countries like China have made considerable investments in military modernisation, India lags behind. Third, India still does not have diplomatic presence in many of the continental countries in Africa as well as littoral countries of the Indian Ocean region. Also, its trade linkages with these countries are very shallow so as to create 'stakes' for these countries. Much of the military diplomatic activities are, therefore, born out of agreements reached with individual countries, rather than being part of a grand strategy. Fourth, often external factors tend to neutralise India's military diplomacy. Witness for example, the recent spate of piracy in the Gulf of Aden, which could be attributed to utter lawlessness in Somalia. The ongoing crisis in Congo has posed a moral dilemma for Indian peacekeepers, due to the emergence of hostile elements and a perceptible shift towards a different mandate. Fifth, there are significant players competing with India with more resources and lucrative terms of engagement. China, for example, has institutionalised military diplomacy not only in the Indian Ocean but also on the continents of Africa and Latin America. ASEAN has institutionalised dialogue platforms to engage the militaries of significant countries that matter to the group.

With so many challenges, India's military diplomacy is yet to catch up with its rising power status. With the security situation in South Asia as well as the larger neighbourhood constantly fluctuating, India should focus on re-inventing the basket of military diplomacy. It could probably learn from the Chinese experience that is based on the judicious balance of military diplomacy and military modernisation, synergy with political and economic diplomacy and above all, securing its periphery through the cooperative security route.