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East Asia Diary - February 2005: Japan's Taiwan Gambit -

After long shying away from expressly stating that it had a role to play in the defence of Taiwan, Japan made its first move on 19 February. The US-Japan Security Consultative Committee comprising the Japanese Foreign and Defence Ministers and their American counterparts made a joint statement whose "common strategic objectives" for East Asia included "peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue," and "[encouraging] China to improve transparency of its military affairs."

China's brief response asked that the Japan-US relationship "not overstep the bilateral category" and that they "take concrete actions to honor their commitment on the Taiwan issue." Behind the brevity of the Chinese remarks, undoubtedly, lies a growing unease of Japanese aims in the region and, as one Chinese commentator put it, "Japan's new move on Taiwan is the thing to watch."

It is, indeed, and it is important to examine why Japan has taken more explicit a position on Taiwan at the current juncture. Several reasons suggest themselves. The first of these comes from the other important concern of the joint statement: North Korea. If Japan thought Beijing had any influence over its neighbour, it might still have adopted a more cautious line in dealing with China. But Kim Jong Il's brinkmanship renders both the Chinese role as mediator and traditional Japanese security assumptions invalid. Together with the Americans, the Japanese seem to think that other approaches need to be tried and extreme options cannot be far from their minds.

Second, there are also limiting factors in the US-Japan relationship. The stress in the Committee's statement on the "realignment of US force structure in Japan" and on "relations between local communities and US forces," relate to increasing strains on the US ability to deal with active theatres elsewhere and to domestic Japanese opposition, particularly in Okinawa, to the US presence. While current realities dictate that the US presence in Japan will continue and that it remains the prime mover in the alliance, it is also evident that the Americans expect Japan to take on greater responsibilities over the longer term.

Third, with China's military still some distance from attaining a decisive edge in the region, Japan, no doubt, thinks it wiser to initiate changes in its approach toward ensuring national security. To this end, openly declaring China a potential enemy in its defense outline, last year was one of many steps. And, while the Committee's statement calls for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue, as Shinzo Abe, acting Secretary General of Japan's governing Liberal Democratic Party said, "It would be wrong for us to send a signal to China that the United States and Japan will watch and tolerate China's military invasion of Taiwan.... If the situation surrounding Japan threatens our security, Japan can provide US forces with support." The continuing reliance on American backup must not mask the fact that such opinions are now voiced regularly and openly at the highest levels in Japan.

Fourth, Taiwan is in many ways a natural point of focus for Japan. Taiwan's experience under imperial Japan was benign in comparison with those of other Japanese colonies before the end of World War II. There is, therefore, a much more positive view of Japan among the Taiwanese, reinforced, perhaps also, by the harsh martial rule under the Guomindang that followed the Japanese defeat. Relations between the two island countries have grown especially close since the advent of democracy in Taiwan under the Japan-educated Lee Teng-hui. In strategic terms, the sea lanes around Taiwan are of vital importance to Japan and Chinese suzerainty in this area has obvious implications. Thus, reports of an anti-secession law being prepared in China, supposedly legalizing the use of military force to retake Taiwan, could also have forced the Japanese to declare their position sooner.

There are, however, three caveats Japan would do well to take note of. One, expressions of relief and welcome to the US-Japan statement, from the Taiwanese side have come mostly from the pro-independence camp. Opposition parties have warned that a Japanese role would only encourage increased Chinese military buildups and have called Taiwan not to get involved. Given the mixed verdict of the recent parliamentary elections in Taiwan, this split in its political spectrum cannot be ignored by Japan.

Two, every disputed island claimed by China is also claimed by Taiwan and that includes the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands over which spats continue to erupt between China and Japan. While it is possible, that Taiwan could use its claim as a bargaining chip with the Japanese, to be let in on a bigger strategic role in the region, this is a line taken only by the present ruling dispensation.

Three, Japan's experiences with South Korea - considered a friend in the region - over the nuclear issue, the matter of Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea, and not least, the disputed Tokdo/Takeshima Island, should remind Japan that history could still play spoilsport in its attempts to chart a new course in the region. And Taiwan need not be an exception to the rule.