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East Asia Diary - December 2004: The 'East Asia Community' - Promise Aplenty

A raft of agreements were signed at the 10th ASEAN summit in Vientiane, Laos. The most important, between China and ASEAN, will lead to the creation of the world's largest Free Trade Area (FTA) by 2010 and cover about a third of the world's population. And in the run-up to their respective FTAs with ASEAN, Japan signed agreements with the Philippines, and South Korea moved closer to an FTA with Singapore. FTAs between ASEAN and India, Australia and New Zealand are also envisioned over the coming decade. ASEAN itself, agreed to eliminate by 2007, barriers on 11 major groups of products that account for nearly 50% of intra-region trade.

Equally significant was the Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao's call for an "unprecedented grand endeavor" - an East Asia Community (EAC) - a call he made clear, was "in the interests of China's own development" and with it at the centre of the enterprise. Historically, the Chinese 'Middle Kingdom' itself, could be termed as a whole series of such 'communities', while Japan offered the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere before World War II. Subsequent, more benign, attempts included Mahathir Mohammed's call in the 1980s and Japan's idea of an Asian Monetary Fund, following the currency crisis in 1997.

The modern ventures were, however, all scuppered by a combination of unresolved historical and political questions and outside intervention. Indeed, the call for the EAC came even as Japan openly declared China a threat in its National Defence Outline. The realists will also point out that China's ambitions remain unalloyed, especially with regard to Taiwan and that ASEAN too is hedging its bets through the ARF that includes the US, and by counting on Japan and India to be counterweights to China. Nevertheless, there are important trends.

First, external influence, in the form of the US, is progressively weakening in the wake of the rise of an alternate - and increasingly acceptable - power in China. The US still remains a key arbiter in the balance of power and its importance to the economies of East Asia is undeniable, but its opposition to previous attempts at community-building in the region, and its picking and choosing of the trade commitments it will honour, have taken the sheen off US influence. And the boldness with which China has stepped in - despite several internal challenges - tying its economic well-being to external stability and peaceful relations with its neighbours, should convince the rest of East Asia that Chinese economic prosperity is a pie that they can share in too.

Second, East Asian economies have reached that stage where further progress depends on not letting history and politics do all the dictating. "Comprehensive national power "and "peaceful rise" are concepts that have had many looking for clues to an undeclared Chinese belligerence. Indeed, there are plenty available, but the point remains whether, in this day and age, China can afford to take the sort of unilateral and large-scale actions that made possible the rise of the great powers before the 20th century. The external and internal challenges alluded to above, are significant. China appears to have decided that 'the bigger the power, the harder the fall' and since it wants to be a great power, it does not also want to fall from that perch. China's preferred way seems to be economic linkages rather than the military conquests of old.

Similarly, Japan's emergent military posture is also not quite as alarming as it would have been some years ago. It also helps that Japan has often explained its position at ASEAN forums. In 2002, it was Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi who in fact, called for a "community that walks together and advances together". But Japan needs to do more to compensate for its shrinking economic clout in the region. The 2003 Japan-ASEAN summit in Tokyo resulted in a "special relationship" declaration and continued Japanese aid especially to the geopolitically important Mekong River region. However, Japan faces the problem of overcoming its powerful domestic agricultural lobby if it has to realize its plans for a successful FTA with ASEAN.

There are other examples of closer economic relations pushing changes in the security dimension. Wen Jiabao's signature on a China-ASEAN strategic declaration at the summit, committed China to "good behavior" in Southeast Asia, including the South China Sea. In October 2003, China had acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in Southeast Asia, becoming the first major power outside ASEAN to do so. It is also significant that the first-ever tripartite declaration between China, Japan and South Korea had come on the sidelines of the 9th ASEAN summit at Bali and related to a pledge to promote security dialogue to maintain peace and stability in East Asia.

For the moment, though, politics and statesmanship must play a part in ensuring a peaceful East Asia - the EAC is on shaky ground still. But it is a vision that needs persisting with. If the future is one in which political tensions could be subsumed by overarching economic linkages, then the EAC could be the means to that future.