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The UNSC (United Nations Security Council) released the annual Panel of Experts (PoE) Report on violations of sanctions by the DPRK on 29 June 2012 (http://bit.ly/LpF9h8). Its publication is significant because the official release of PoE reports on the circumvention of sanctions by the DPRK have been consistently opposed by China at the Security Council since 2010. China’s objections may have led to a delay in the 2012 report’s publication by about a month but it did not oppose it entirely despite being a conduit for illicit trafficking to the DPRK. If the report indirectly points fingers at China’s involvement in DPRK sanctions violations, which is presumably why the former repudiated the release of previous reports at the UNSC, why has it chosen to pass this one through for official publication? What is the strategic logic in China’s move?

First, while the past report may not have been released officially by the UNSC, it was leaked, perhaps even deliberately. The text would not be quoted verbatim but the content would nevertheless be analysed in the media. In addition, the report would be read by the permanent members of the UNSC and the State representatives to the Panel of Experts (in this case, the P5 plus Japan and ROK) drafting the report before the report is blocked. China’s non-compliance with sanctions is therefore a truth universally acknowledged, with or without the UNSC publication stamp.

Second, while China’s relationship with the DPRK is always under intense scrutiny, the level of its influence over DPRK is ambiguous. It is interesting that being pushed into a corner by DPRK (by not obliging China with better behaviour) has led China to attempt to push the DPRK into its own little corner. General truculence by the DPRK impinges heavily on China’s position as its only guarantor but thus far, it has been unable to reign the DPRK in. It also almost suggests a kind of Chinese desperation in which any option towards DPRK will be considered as long as it shies away from North Korea's threshold for intolerance. The previous PoE report (2011) may have been blocked by China to cover for the DPRK, but its gesture of goodwill has not been reciprocated by the DPRK in similar measure. History testifies to this shortcoming – despite their generous patronage of DPRK in the 1950s, neither China nor the USSR had sufficient say in DPRK matters – and this precedence probably directs Chinese strategy. This year, therefore, China’s no objection certificate to the release of the PoE Report would spell China’s leverage out to the DPRK quite explicitly.

A UNSC document holds much more legitimacy than a leaked report if China is to attempt ‘tightening’ its sanctions compliance once its role in violations is made public officially. Dalian Port in China finds various mentions in the report as a trans-shipment hub for illicit transfers to and from the DPRK. This is a good position for China to be in for two reasons. It can shirk individual responsibility and condemnation from the international community by referring to ‘weak’ (they may or may not deliberately be so) trade control meaures, and make relevant promises to tighten them, which would be a conciliatory gesture. Mark Hibbs has blogged about China’s strategic choices at Arms Control Wonk (http://bit.ly/MPy9bq), where he says that ‘China is disinclined to intervene to prevent at least a modicum amount of this trade from taking place’ - in reference to China’s role in the violation of UN sanctions by the DPRK.

Making statements therefore do not necessarily mean that China will or for that matter can usher in changes in compliance with UN sanctions. However, such statements are likely to intimidate the DPRK given their trade and illicit trafficking dependence on China. Despite the intimidation, DPRK responding to it as a direct threat from China and resorting to provocation would not be appropriate as China would have already cited external pressure to implement compliance, in accordance with sanctions obligations as a P5 State. In addition, the Report states that although UN sanctions have not caused the DPRK ‘to halt its banned activities, they appear to have slowed them and made illicit transactions significantly more difficult and expensive’, thereby intensifying the feeling of being cornered for the DPRK.

In spite of being the DPRK’s only ‘patron’, China is not in a position to reprimand it for its periodic provocations. Doing so runs the risk of bellicosity from the DPRK, which China can ill-afford. DPRK’s reliance on China is immense but a fact that goes unacknowledged by the former. Using its leverage and responsibility as a P5 State (through the publication of the PoE Report) would allow China to drive home the importance of having a friend at the UNSC, without inviting belligerence from the DPRK and without having to resort to overt pressure which would bear harsh consequences.