China - Articles

China's Anti-Secession Law: The View from Taiwan

The anti-secession law (ASL) passed by the Chinese National People's Congress on 14 March 2005 has elicited a range of opinion in Taiwan - from life-goes-on-as-usual to furious condemnation. Views that straddle the middle ground include the belief that the ASL is a much milder version of Beijing's oft-stated positions on Taiwan and incorporates several restraints to prevent any drastic move towards use of force. Others hope that Hu Jintao is only trying to consolidate his position before exploring more moderate approaches to Taiwan.

These interpretations ensure that the ASL could become a potent tool with China to influence Taiwan's domestic politics. In fact, the law succeeded in creating fissures within the political alliances on the Island even before it was passed.

The negotiations for the first direct flights between Taiwan and China since 1949 are a case in point. Aimed at facilitating travel by Taiwanese businessmen and their families in China to their homes for the Lunar New Year celebrations, the flights were an important breakthrough in cross-Straits relations. While the delegations from both sides conducted their negotiations in secrecy, Beijing hosted the Guomindang (KMT) of the Taiwanese opposition pan-blue alliance for separate high-profile talks, allowing the latter to claim credit for the success of this initiative. It is highly unlikely that the Chinese side and the KMT did not discuss the ASL and reach some understanding on other Taiwanese issues as well.

Besides sharpening the animosity between Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian's Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the KMT, it is noteworthy that the People First Party (PFP) of James Soong, the junior member of the pan-blue alliance, was left out of these deals with China. In the December elections, the KMT made its gains at the expense of the PFP, and the latter decided that its partner was upstaging it. Thus, on 24 February, a deal was reached between Soong and Chen that surprised most political observers.

Under the deal, Chen reaffirmed his "five-no's pledge" related to Taiwanese independence and agreed not to stand against Soong in a presidential election. The PFP seemed to be currying favour with Beijing by trying to get Chen off his independence agenda and appearing to be a reliable partner for Beijing. Chen, for his part, seemed to be shoring up support for legislation aimed at domestic reforms. For the pan-green camp, however, the deal resulted in bitter recriminations, with the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), an alliance partner, criticizing the pact. Even within the DPP, there were resignations and talk of Chen having sold out.

Meanwhile, the rally against the ASL organized by the pan-greens on 26 March provided glimpses of the contradictions at the heart of the Taiwanese thinking. One, while a million people were expected, the numbers were well below that figure but, this does not detract from the strong feelings on display. Two, the protesters were overwhelmingly grey - the old were on the streets in larger numbers than the youth or even the middle-aged. This indicates a general indifference by the youth and the breadwinners in the family. In Taiwan, the former section gives the impression of being apathetic to politics, while the latter reflect the belief that Taiwan is increasingly linked to the mainland for its economic prosperity. As regards the aged, it is possible many were there out of antipathy towards the KMT rather than any genuine support for independence. This is not an uncommon viewpoint in Taiwan.

Three, regional divisions are apparent in the independence debate. Busloads of protestors were brought in from the western and southern coastal cities of Taichung, Tainan and Kaohsiung where support for independence is strongest. Four, Chen Shui-bian's choosing the middle way protesting without either leading the march or making any speeches shows how swiftly anti-China rhetoric has dropped in Taiwan. His government itself seems divided, with Vice-President Annette Lu opposing the government's participation in the rally and only appearing  towards the end while Prime Minister Frank Hsieh took part in the march, even calling on civil servants to join it.

Finally, the KMT's position as the largest opposition group in Taiwan is important. It has responded by preparing to send another delegation to Beijing in the week after the rally and with plans for its chairman, Lien Chan, to visit China - the first time a KMT leader would do so after 1949.

A poster held up at the rally best sums up these contradictions, even if inadvertently: "Taiwan is already independent." If so, why bother with laws of "another nation"? That the Taiwanese need to bother is the only clear message. And it is unlikely that the symbolism of American or Japanese flags flying at the protests will change the situation.