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#1764, 14 June 2005

Beijing Courts Taiwanese Opposition

Jabin T Jacob
National Chengchi University, Taipei

Taiwanese opposition leaders, Lien Chan of the Guomindang (KMT) and James Soong of the People First Party (PFP), were hosted by China with great fanfare between April to mid-May. China has thus enhanced its encroachment in Taiwanese domestic politics by a little bit. This increasing urgency shown by China comes with good reason. Amidst growing Taiwanese consciousness, the fifteen percent of the 'mainlander' population on Taiwan which gave China a tiny foothold on the island is slowly being absorbed into the larger mass.

Hu Jintao, by talking to Lien, sought perhaps to lower the credibility of Chen Shui-bian's win. Lien had lost the last presidential election in Taiwan by a narrow margin. The importance attached to the meeting with Soong, leader of the junior member of the pan-blue coalition, according to some quarters, gives further indication of Beijing's thinking on the legitimacy of democratic choice in Taiwan. Although it could have been Soong's '10-point consensus' with Chen, it might have given him greater weight in meeting with Hu. Moreover, there was talk of Chen having entrusted Soong to convey a message to Hu for him.

The Taiwanese pro-independence camp's argument that visits were a sellout to China has its merits. Lien praised Chinese village-level elections but seemed to rundown Taiwanese democracy as mere populism and made little reference to the Republic of China (ROC). Neither leader mentioned the Anti-Secession Law, either. But, Soong repeatedly mentioned the ROC. The Chinese state media censored his subsequent speech in Nanjing. At Tsinghua University, Soong also appeared to refer to Chinese missiles aimed at Taiwan. Soong was more willing to talk about a 'Taiwan consciousness', but consistent in his opposition to the idea of Taiwanese independence. He called it "a dead end."

Chen's call for Hu to visit Taiwan was dismissed by Beijing, which stressed that his Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) had to first accept the 'one China' principle and give up its advocacy of Taiwanese independence. Should that be the case, Hu's own offer to Chen stated, "No matter what [anyone] has said or done in the past, we are ready to talk with them?". Interestingly, following Soong's return, Chen had to issue denials that he had ever told Soong that he was opposed to Taiwan's independence or that he was planning to visit China in August.

Beijing's new semantics at the end of the Soong visit ? ?two shores, one China?, allowing the two sides to differ on precisely what that term means ? only harks back to the unwritten 1992 consensus in Hong Kong under which both sides agreed that Taiwan and the mainland belonged to a ?one China? that each side interpreted in its own way. The DPP has consistently rejected the existence or validity of such a consensus.

China also dangled economic bait. During the visits, it offered to form a Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) on the same lines as with Hong Kong and Macao. Taiwan has all along called for a Free Trade Agreement (FTA), as between sovereign nations. To cut away at the DPP's traditional support base, China offered to lift tariffs on several fruit varieties produced mostly in Taiwan's pro-independence southern counties. It also declared that it would lift restrictions on its citizens visiting Taiwan.

Ironically, the Communist Party of China is developing close ties with the two parties in Taiwan. By implication, a precedent is being set for more than one political party in China. There is also an acknowledgement that democratic changes in Taiwan cannot be reversed the way it has been attempted in Hong Kong.

In Taiwan the first reaction to the visits came in the form of National Assembly election results. The Assembly was elected to consider a bill passed by the legislature to reform voting and legislative structures and ultimately replace the Assembly with referendums. The result left both sides of the island's political divide stunned. Despite the 'China fever' and the bickering in the pan-green camp, the DPP won most seats, while Soong's PFP fared extremely poorly. However, the voter turnout was also extremely low at 23 percent - blamed on bad weather and confusion over the objectives of the Assembly. Given that Taiwan has a history of high turnouts in elections, the low voter turnout bears out a newspaper editorial captioned, "Lack of leadership killing Taiwan". It was a reaction also to Chen's inability to take a consistent stance on the visits.

Taiwanese value their freedom and transition to democratic society, but increasingly seem unaware as to where their leaders are taking them. Status quo might be dearer to ordinary Taiwanese after the visits but there also appears to be a sense of a loss of control over their future.

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