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9th Shangri-La Dialogue: Straight Talk, Bluster and Skepticism in Asia’s Choppy Waters

Jabin T Jacob
Hermès Fellow, Sciences Po, Bordeaux, France
and
Research Fellow, IPCS
e-mail: jabin@ipcs.org

INTRODUCTION
 
The 9th edition of the annual Asia Security Summit of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) also called the Shangri-La Dialogue was held in Singapore from 4-6 June this year. It kicked off with a ringing call by South Korean President Lee Myung-Bak for Asia to step up to the plate and “take on more responsibilities as part of a global family.” Also in his keynote address, Lee took pains to emphasize the impartial nature of the Cheonan investigation that finally pinned the blame on North Korea for the sinking of the South Korean naval corvette in late March this year. That said, it was painfully obvious that both South Korea and its ally the United States, were grappling with the issue of responding appropriately to nuclear-armed North Korea’s unprovoked act of aggression. In the first plenary session, US Secretary of Defence, Robert Gates was reduced to bluster as far as any responses to the Cheonan incident went. Even if there was “no question about the strength of [US] conventional forces” and “no question about the striking capability of those forces,” it was not immediately clear just what could be done to make North Korea pay.
 
US-CHINA SPAT
 
Meanwhile, Gates was unambiguous in expressing his displeasure with the Chinese for suspending military-to-military interactions between the two sides over US arms sales to Taiwan. He went so far as to accuse the Chinese PLA specifically of seeking to thwart the improvement of relations between the countries. Gates’ charge was countered from the floor and by Gen. Ma Xiaotian, the Chinese PLA Deputy Chief of Staff, who spoke in the subsequent plenary session. As far as the Chinese were concerned, American arms sales to Taiwan were a clear sign of interference in China’s internal affairs and did not indicate an American intention for genuine engagement with China. To Gates, however, the Chinese were picking a fight over “old news.”
 
Also speaking in the second plenary session were the Indian NSA, Shivshankar Menon and the Japanese Defence Minister, Toshimi Kitazawa. Menon argued that as security challenges acquired an increasingly transnational character owing to geopolitical, technological and economic developments, “these have to be dealt with differently from traditional security issues.” Fighting nuclear proliferation and terrorism, staving off climate change, maritime security, and maintaining the security of the global commons were among the key challenges that he highlighted.
 
REGIONAL SECURITY ARCHITECTURES
 
The Dialogue saw two plenary sessions devoted broadly to the theme of security architectures in the Asia-Pacific region. In the first of these, the respective ministers of defence from the UK, South Korea and Australia spoke. While the South Korean minister focused on the Cheonan incident, it was unclear what the UK, as a declining and increasingly irrelevant militarily power, could contribute to a forum on Asia-Pacific issues except in terms of platitudes. The Australian Minister meanwhile, made another pitch for his Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s idea of an Asia Pacific Community. However, his continued reiteration of the relevance of ASEAN to such a new grouping remained unconvincing and probably explains why the idea has gained little traction in the region. Earlier, the US Secretary of Defence had expressed his nation’s commitment to Asia’s security architecture in the form of “continued forward presence of substantial US forces in the region,” while Menon pointed out that even as Cold War-era institutions in other regions were seeking “new roles” for themselves, Asia had the option of building an “open, inclusive, plural and flexible architecture” that would help it deal with the new kinds of security threats it faced. Gen. Ma’s references to a security architecture meanwhile focused mainly on their nature as partnerships based on equality and mutual trust. Both Menon and Ma were clear however, that ASEAN would be at the centre of such endeavours.
 
In a later session on regional security architectures, the Indonesian Defence Minister, Purnomo Yusgiantoro, made the most clear-eyed presentation of the questions before regional institutions. He argued that instead of a two-tier structure with the major powers as security guarantors and the smaller members as benefactors, it was preferable to have all members on an equal footing and bearing the same responsibilities. He also called for the widest possible membership and democratic decision-making as well as multi-layered integration depending on the issues at hand. While admitting that the ARF suffered from a reputation as a mere “talk-shop,” he stated that the decision to establish the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting+8 (ADMM Plus) signaled a renewed commitment to security issues in the region. Vietnam will be hosting the first ADMM Plus meeting later this year and its Defence Minister Gen. Phung Quang Thanh was frank in stating that there remained “some elements in Asia-Pacific with potential to put regional stability at risk” and that “a more comprehensive approach and a closer cooperation” was therefore necessary. A new regional security architecture had to be shaped by engaging powers that had “interest and influence in the region.”
 
NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITY ISSUES
 
The region’s non-traditional security threats were highlighted in two plenary sessions dealing with humanitarian and disaster relief and counterinsurgency, respectively. The plenary on humanitarian and disaster relief showcased a wide variety of topics with Defence Ministers from Malaysia, Chile and New Zealand speaking. The Malaysian minister made the key point that states without the capacity should invite foreign aid to assist in relief operations. However, he also immediately followed this up by saying that such aid had to be on the recipient country’s terms, throwing into doubt whether ASEAN had actually learnt any lessons from Myanmar’s tardy and ineffectual handling of relief operations in the wake of Cyclone Nargis in May 2008. Clearly, there are several key issues that ASEAN as an organization has yet to come to terms with including the key question of how to deal with Myanmar.
 
The Russian Deputy Prime Minister, Sergei Ivanov, and the Sri Lankan Foreign Minister, GL Peiris addressed the plenary on counterinsurgency and strengthening governance. Both men spoke eloquently and with conviction about the limitations of a military solution to ensuring lasting peace in conflict situations. Ivanov could not resist pointing out that no matter how disputed the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan was, there was never a drug problem of the scale and seriousness witnessed today in Afghanistan and with ramifications across its borders in Russia itself and beyond. Peiris meanwhile, argued that following the defeat of the LTTE, the Sri Lankan government, which for the first time since 1977 enjoyed a two-thirds majority in parliament, was now in a position to enact legislative changes to address grievances and ensure lasting peace in the country. He declared that more than 70 per cent of the country’s emergency regulations had been withdrawn and called on the diaspora to contribute to national reconstruction. However, neither Ivanov nor Peiris were able to fully convince delegates about their respective approaches to the Chechnyan and Tamil problems in the post-conflict environment.
 
The Shangri-La Dialogue also saw smaller special sessions on subjects ranging from the proliferation of offensive capabilities, including WMD to climate change and space and cyber warfare. This author participated in a special session on nation building in conflict situations addressed by representatives from Pakistan, Timor-Leste and Canada. Lt. Gen. Khalid Shameem Wynne provided an overview of what he termed was his country’s successful counterinsurgency operations in the Swat Valley. While outlining the various stages of the Pakistan Army’s operations – clear, hold, build and transfer – he admitted that it was in the “build and transfer” stages that involved a mix of military and civilian personnel and approaches that the greatest challenges were faced, given weak civilian capacity. The Pakistani weakness – or the strength of the military institutional capacity in contrast to civilian capabilities – was all the more apparent when contrasted with Canadian operations in Afghanistan where the civilian component was introduced as rapidly and efficiently as possible in the various stages.
 
CONCLUSION
 
The Shangri-La Dialogue lived up to its billing as one of the world’s premier forums for facilitating dialogue and understanding security issues among the countries. With the Asia-Pacific’s increasing centrality in political, economic and security terms, both issues of concern and the stakes have multiplied, as have the number of players jostling for space and attention. The ‘Track 1.5’ nature of the Dialogue ensures that key concerns of defence officials from the region are debated and discussed in a wider public forum – often without punches being pulled – and it also helps in stimulating the exchange of ideas. Clearly, the Dialogue’s role in shaping the region’s security structures and mechanisms is only likely to increase with time.

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