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A limited war was, and still is, a strategic possibility so long as proxy war continues on the sub- continent. As Ashley Tellis put it in the last India Today Conclave, “I believe that limited war should be viewed not as a product of the proclivities of the state, but rather as a predicament resulting from a specific set of structural circumstances.�

I will not go into strategic or operational details of how to successfully conduct a limited war.

I am not one of those who believe that war makes the state and the states exist only to make wars. No one in his right senses want to have a war on one’s hands. Least of all democracies like India; and people like me who have studied, participated, and had to conduct a war. But the Armed Forces have to be prepared for all possible conflict contingencies. Is any one of you prepared to say today that a war has become obsolete? A war is a risky activity. So, how can anyone give you a guarantee that there shall be no risk of escalation in a limited war?

But what surprises me is the criticism from people who not only practice war for the same reason but also accept the concept of pre-emption. They do not find much wrong in USA invading Iraq while suspecting Saddam to be in the possession of WMD. (Suppose Saddam did have those weapons, what would have been his/US coalition reaction? Did they consider such a contingency or not?) Some of those very people tell us don’t talk of limited war; it is dangerous. They have their own definitions of terrorism and proxy war, and will not do enough to ensure that proxy war, which can always lead to a limited conventional war, must stop on the sub- continent. They talk more of nuclear escalation and less of what may cause a conventional war.

And now I come to the essays on the 'Limited war and escalation control' written by Michael Krepon in his book Escalation Control in South Asia. Michael is a good friend, and I respect his intellect, sagacity, and value his friendship. His book is educative, useful, and valuable ......... except where he and I differ! He knows that I believe in escalation control but strongly oppose terrorism; state sponsored or not. I have myself participated in two of his conferences on Escalation Control and made my contribution. Some comments are: -

Yes! Stability instability paradox does exist in South Asia. The reason is the on-going proxy war on the sub continent. The concept of such a limited war has no connection with nuclear theories or tactical nuclear weapons. Fundamentally, it avoids escalation to a level of nuclear threshold.

Michael Krepon states that two chastening experiences – Kargil war and prolonged military deployment of 2002 – have provided the impetus for constructive engagement in nuclear risk reduction and expert level talks on nuclear CBMs. May I remind you that we took the initiative before these two events in the form of the MoU that was signed in Lahore in February 1999? We seem to have done a full circle on that. I continue to support all such CBMs.

Have nuclear tests created greater tension on the sub-continent? The nuclear pessimists say yes. Michael tends to agree with them. In talking about a limited war, I may sound another pessimist. But actually, I am not. My view is that it has created greater stability between India and China. Higher-level stability has also been introduced between Pakistan and India too. At lower level, however, it has created further instability due to on-going proxy war. This is well below a nuclear threshold and only in short term. In the long run, people will realise the dangers and futility of proxy war and LIC (low intensity conflict), and then escalation control will become more effective. I believe there is still a great deal of sense of responsibility on the sub-continent. Even during a war, people on the sub-continent are more sensitive to collateral damage than the West. To that extent, I am an optimist.

I also believe that India-Pakistan nuclear hyphenation, like all strategic issues, distorts the realities of the sub-continent. It is a responsible, but a narrow view.

A few days ago, I asked Mr Chari why were some people critical of my limited war statement when they did not disagree with its possibility and rationale. His answer was, it is seen as provocative. Well! So long as the rationale is accepted and it enables people to understand, that proxy war or low intensity war on the LoC is dangerous and it can escalate into a conventional war, my provocation would have served a useful purpose.

And what is more provocative – a proxy war or a limited war? You decide!

* Second part of text of the talk given during discussion on Michael Krepon’s book Escalation Control in South Asia at the India Habitat Centre, New Delhi on 17 November 2004 organised by the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies.