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Clausewitz may be out of fashion and less relevant today but no one can question his evergreen noting, “Each age has had its own peculiar forms of war.... Each, therefore, would also keep its own theory of war.”

As someone who had to learn, understand and practice war as a career for over four decades, I could also add, “Except for the background of a conflict, war circumstances and war situations are seldom alike.”

Comparing current strategic situation on the subcontinent with nuclear theology of the Cold War to bring out an intended message, howsoever noble that may be, is neither objective nor sound. There is a need to understand the strategic reality of South Asia and the circumstances under which a limited war has been considered likely or possible.

After conducting nuclear tests at Pokharan and Chagai in May 1998, political establishments in India and Pakistan thought that we could now usher in an era of security and stability on the sub-continent. Unfortunately, the tests and overt nuclear capability had an opposite impact on the proxy war already initiated by Pakistan. Contrary to expectations, the covert war intensified on the ground.

It was apparent that nuclear optimists, who believed in nuclear deterrence theory, had not taken into account the stability-instability paradox or a proxy war. I do not blame them. Nuclear deterrence was an established and a rational concept. Use of terror and proxy war in the spectrum of conflict to destabilize the adversary was neither an established concept nor rational. The West realised this lower end of conflict spectrum only after 9/11. We have been facing the music for a long time.

In November 1998, while addressing National Defence College of India, I had stated, rather warned, “ If terrorism/militancy/proxy war grows too big, both the ‘initiator’ and the ‘affected’ nation are tempted to go into a conventional war fighting mode. ‘Initiator’â€â€�To give it a greater push to achieve the desired goal. And the ‘Affected’â€â€�Pushed to the wall: tries to bring the proxy war into the open so that it does not have to fight with the limitations of a ‘no war, no peace’ situation.”

India took a major initiative of discussing terrorism and nuclear CBMs with Pakistan at Lahore in February 1999. I was part of the Government then. But what was the result? The result was the Kargil war. It was totally irrational and, therefore, a surprise. I am not condoning poor intelligence and surveillance. The Kargil war was a big challenge to us. We achieved spectacular success against heavy odds without escalating the conflict. After the war, we had to go through the whole conflict scenario once again. We had to analyse and find an answer to this new challenge below the nuclear threshold, other than launching a covert or a proxy war.

With nuclear weapons here to stay, it is hard to see a large-scale conventional war between India and Pakistan, or for that matter even with China. The probability of an all out high intensity regular war hereafter will remain low. Even if a conventional war breaks out, it is likely to be limited in time and scope.

Was there a space between proxy war and a high intensity conventional war? The answer had been given by Pakistan in Kargil and our reaction to that. How small or big is this space? This I believe will always be a matter of circumstances, conjecture and debate. What are the factors that will impact this space? For that one has to consider: -

Who takes the initiative? What is the international perception? Will the adversary chance nuclear retaliation even when its survival is nowhere at stake? How limited are the political and military objectives? How big and effective are the conventional forces on both sides? The nuclear doctrine and its credibility! How low is the adversary’s nuclear threshold? If it is very low, then why keep large conventional forces? Will the adversary heed or not heed deterrent response of nuclear retaliation?

Was this space exploitable? The answer was yes. It had been done in the past. Pakistan had done it now. This space becomes more exploitable if you are reacting to a Kargil type or proxy war situation.

What could be the nature of war within this exploitable space? It would have to be conducted within the framework of carefully calibrated political goals and military moves that permit greater control over escalation and disengagement, and greater synchronization of politics, diplomacy military and others, as we did in Kargil war. It would imply limited political and military objectives, not to hurt the adversary excessively at any one time, limited in duration, in geography, and in the level of forces used. Such a conflict could also spread out in time in what could possibly be termed as a war in ‘slow motion’.

Almost all these factors have a bearing on escalation control. In addition, there is also the factor of ‘escalation dominance’. That too has a bearing on escalation control. There is yet another factor that is peculiar but applicable to the sub continent. Even during conflicts and wars, communications between India and Pakistan have seldom broken down completely. Let me remind you that during Kargil war, both at political and military levels, the hot lines continued to work. We tend to fight and talk at the same time.

So, a limited war was, and still is, a strategic possibility so long as proxy war continues on the sub continent.

* First part of text of the talk given during discussion on Michael Krepon’s book Escalation Control in South Asia at the India Habitat Centre, New Delhi on 17 November 2004 organised by the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies.