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#643, 22 November 2001
 
The Taliban “Split”: Forking a Knife
D Suba Chandran
Research Officer, IPCS
 

One major war effort of the West and the Northern Alliance inside Afghanistan was to split the Taliban. The West, led by the US , has been using at least three strategies to achieve this. 

 

 

First, the intense bombing to cripple the Taliban militarily and terrorize the Taliban fighters into abandoning the Taliban.

 

 

The second strategy employs diplomatic and financial means to engender the split. The US, Pakistan and National Alliance, along with some other Afghan leaders have been engaged in splitting the Taliban ever since the war began. One of the main missions of Abdul Haq, a former mujahideen who went inside Afghanistan towards the end of October, was to contact leaders within the Taliban who could be won over. Unfortunately, but expectedly he was killed by the Taliban. 

 

 

The third strategy involves the use ofthe electronic media, led by the CNN, to create the impression that the Taliban is splitting. Though this propaganda has been successful outside Afghanistan , it is doubtful whether it had any significant impact inside as the Talibs hardly watch these programmes.

 

 

What is the liklihood of a split? It is essential to examine the composition of the Taliban to study the probabilities of a split. 

 

 

The Taliban comprises five major groups. First a core led by Mullah Omar, also known as the Kandhahar group. This is a small group comprising those who had joined Mullah Omar before the Taliban emerged and belonged to the Supreme Council that ruled from Kabul . Mullah Hasan, the acting head of the Council (who replaced Mullah Rabbani after his death), Mulla Wakil Ahmad Mutawwakil, Taliban’s Foreign Minister, and 25-30 others form this Kandhahar group. 

 

 

The second group consists of the Talibs, or students, who are followers of Mullah Omar. The Talibs are young Pashtun Afghans educated in various madrassas in Pakistan . When Mullah Omar formed the Taliban, young Afghans of the Afghan refugee community in Pakistan found a purpose to their life by joining the Taliban. Their exact strength is not known, though it is estimated around 30,000. 

 

 

The third group consists of former warlords and their supporters who joined the Taliban either voluntarily or out of fear. These warlords, belong to various communities, are predominantly former mujahideens, and held small territories under their control. With weapons supplied by the CIA and Pakistan ’s Inter Intelligence Service (ISI) to fight the Soviet troops, they had enough firepower to prevent the then ruling Rabbani government from having any influence inside their territory. When the Taliban movement gained momentum in 1994-95, the first casualty was these warlords. They did not endorse Omar’s fundamentalist policies, but had no option but to  join the Taliban for survival. 

 

 

The fourth group comprises of mujahideens who were part of the then ruling Rabbani government and later defected to the Taliban. 

 

 

The fifth group is made up of Arabs who came with Osama bin Laden to Afghanistan before and after the Soviet troops left Afghanistan . At present, they have approximately 5000 Arab fighters alongside the Taliban.

 

 

Of these five groups, the first – the Kandhahar group – remains loyal to Mullah Omar. Attempts to win over people like Mulla Wakil Ahmad Muttawwakil, Taliban’s Foreign Minister and Maulvi Jallaludin Haqqani, the unofficial Commander of the Taliban Army, have not succeeded. It is doubtful whether this group would ever defect; they would rather die with Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden.

 

 

The second group, the madrassa-educated young Taliban fighters are completely indoctrinated. They are more or less like Mullah Omar’s human robots on an Islamic mission to fight a jihad against infidels. It is unlikely that this group would ever defect. Currently they have gone into hiding, along with their leaders, in the southern mountains.

 

 

The third and fourth group, comprising of former warlords and mujahideens, who had defected to the Taliban, are most likely to defect from the Taliban. Ideologically, they do not share the same platform as the Taliban and had no power as the Kandhahar group. Besides, they resented the Arab influence, especially that of bin Laden. This group’s loyalty, to any side, was always dubious and the West is likely to win them over, calling them “moderate” Taliban.

 

 

The last group, consisting of Arabs, led by Osama bin Laden, would never defect and fight till the end.

 

 

Given these factors, the Taliban will not lose its essential fighting machinery, despite losing territory to the Northern Alliance

 
Article by same Author
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Af-Pak Diary: The Taliban Apologists, Opportunists and Opponents

A 'Delhi Discourse' with Central Asia: Reviving Linkages

Reading Pakistan: A New Taliban Shura

Af-Pak Diary: Exporting Sectarianism?

Reading Pakistan: What will follow the NATO Strikes?

Af-Pak Diary: Civil War and Instability as an Option in Afghanistan

Reading Pakistan: What if US-Pak Ties Break?

Reading Pakistan: Why is the Haqqani Network so Important?

Af-Pak Diary: From Ahmad Shah Massoud to Rabbani

Ten Years After: ‘Terror Franchisees’ as an Evolving Phenomenon

Ten Years After: Al Qaeda’s Game Plan

Af-Pak Diary: Will Mullah Omar Negotiate? What is Taliban's End Game?

Af-Pak Diary: Should India Adapt to the Game, or Attempt to Change It?

Reading Pakistan-IV: A War within Pakistan’s Security Establishment?

Reading Pakistan-III: Is Pakistan Jihad’s Lebensraum?

After Osama - VI: What will be the al Qaeda’s Game Plan?

After Osama - V: End the War on Terror?

Maulana Showkat Shah: One More Dead; How Many More To Go?

Reading Pakistan-III: Is Military the Only Glue?

Alternative Strategies for J&K: Before Next Summer

Reading Pakistan-II: Four Implications of Salman Taseer’s Assassination

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