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#672, 31 December 2001
 
The Fall of Taliban
D Suba Chandran
 

No one expected that the Taliban would fall so soon. What were the reasons that led to the fall of the Taliban? How is it possible that the Northern Alliance (NA), which is highly fragmented within, been able to advance rapidly, in a month’s time, and capture almost the whole of Afghanistan ?

 

 

Firstly, the superior air power of the United States , led by its B-52 bombers, was the main reason that led to the military fall of the Taliban. The B-1, B-2 and B-52 bombers, flying at altitudes of 50,000 to 60,000 feet, were beyond human and mechanical eyes and ears of the Taliban forces. Being invisible, these bombers bombed the Taliban positions and troops with satellite-guided bombs, cluster bombs and ‘bunker busters’. 

 

 

The bombings, though inaccurate at times, resulted in at least two significant things. It totally demoralized the Taliban troops and won a major psychological war for the Americans. With their medieval attitude towards life and science, the Taliban were totally unprepared for the military warfare of the 21st century led by the United States . AK-47s were the only link between the Taliban’s frozen culture and modern day military gadgetry. Until recent times, Mullah Omar issued ordinances written on torn papers, and at times, on cigarette foils. The Taliban were expecting US led ground troops and in fact were preparing themselves for a ground war; even as the war started, the Taliban Commander-in-Chief, Jalaluddin Haqqani, bragged that Afghanistan would be the graveyard of Americans and warned that the experience, for the US troops, would be worse than in Vietnam .

 

 

While demoralizing the Taliban forces, the bombings added a new vigour to the fighters of the Northern Alliance . The bombings psychologically boosted up the cadres of the NA at the same time also provided air cover for their advancement. Without the air power, it would not have been possible for the NA troops to capture even Mazar-e-Sharif. Besides, the intense bombings though targeted mainly the military installations, either by mistake or by deliberation, also hit civilian areas. The local population, totally terrified wanted the Taliban to go, so that the bombings would stop.

 

 

The second major reason for the fall of Taliban was the total disruption of the command and control structure of the Taliban or whatever resembled it and the cutting off Taliban’s communication systems. The orders for the local and regional Taliban commanders always came from Mullah Omar. With Omar hiding and not communicating to his commanders for the fear of being tracked down by the US satellite networks, the local commanders were left to themselves to take decisions. With no inputs from the top level, the local commanders of the Taliban did not have much option, other than surrendering.

 

 

Third reason for the fall of the Taliban was the de-recognition by two of its vital links to outside world – Pakistan and Saudi Arabia . Right from the day one, the Taliban’s military strategy was guided by the Pakistan ’s ISI. With Pakistan turning hostile towards the Taliban and withdrawing its security advisors (for the fear of getting caught) the Taliban could not mobilize itself militarily. Besides, it is also alleged, that major intelligence inputs to the US military strategy, especially regarding the military targets of the Taliban came from Pakistan . More than the breaking off its ties with Pakistan , it was the active military assistance of Pakistan to the US , which led to the fall of the Taliban.

 

 

Fourth reason was the loss of support even among its own pashtun community. The pashtuns are organized in tribal and sub tribal lines and there exist a number of shuras (councils) all over the pashtun territory. These councils are led by local influential pashtuns, who in most cases also are former mujahideens and warlords. These warlords earlier either joined or supported Taliban not out of ideological reasons but of pragmatism. Once the collapse of the Taliban became evident, these pashtun warlords asserted their independence. The Eastern Shura , based at Jalalabad was the first to proclaim autonomy, which was followed by other local councils all over the southern pashtun belt of Afghanistan . Even in Kandahar , which considered being the birthplace of Taliban, the local leaders asked the Taliban to surrender. It was the loss of the support from the local pashtuns that resulted in the demise of the Taliban. Had they supported, the Taliban would have never given up, atleast in Kandahar province and would have waged a long bloody guerilla war, given the topography of the southern Afghanistan .

 

 

More than the loss of support by the pashtun population, it was the readiness of the local leaders and the people to betray the Taliban, either out of conviction or out of being bribed, had actually made the Taliban to quit fighting. Without the support of the local pashtuns, in terms providing sanctuary, logistics and other essential means to wage a guerilla war, the Taliban knew what is facing them. Hence decided to surrender.

 
Article by same Author
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Reading Pakistan: A New Taliban Shura

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Reading Pakistan: What will follow the NATO Strikes?

Af-Pak Diary: Civil War and Instability as an Option in Afghanistan

Reading Pakistan: What if US-Pak Ties Break?

Reading Pakistan: Why is the Haqqani Network so Important?

Af-Pak Diary: From Ahmad Shah Massoud to Rabbani

Ten Years After: ‘Terror Franchisees’ as an Evolving Phenomenon

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Af-Pak Diary: Will Mullah Omar Negotiate? What is Taliban's End Game?

Af-Pak Diary: Should India Adapt to the Game, or Attempt to Change It?

Reading Pakistan-IV: A War within Pakistan’s Security Establishment?

Reading Pakistan-III: Is Pakistan Jihad’s Lebensraum?

After Osama - VI: What will be the al Qaeda’s Game Plan?

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Reading Pakistan-III: Is Military the Only Glue?

Alternative Strategies for J&K: Before Next Summer

Reading Pakistan-II: Four Implications of Salman Taseer’s Assassination

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