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#623, 23 October 2001
 
Chronicling the Afghanistan Tragedy – VIII The Great Game Returns: American Interests in Afghanistan
D Suba Chandran
Research Officer, IPCS
 

The United States until the second half of the 1970s did not consider Afghanistan of any significance to its security interests. It provided little economic aid and rejected Afghanistan ’s request for military assistance during the 1950s and 60s despite Afghanistan repeated requests and making it clear that the Soviet Union was its main threat.

 

 

Despite its strategic location, like Pakistan , Afghanistan did not receive much US importance till 1978, as the US wished to maintain Afghanistan as a buffer state. The US viewed the Soviet focus upon Afghanistan as “a part of a general effort to counter western gains in the Middle East South Asia area” and did not consider the Soviet influence over Afghanistan as a threat to its strategic interests. The US felt that the Soviet efforts in Afghanistan were defensive, hence it should not be given undue significance. 

 

 

Secondly, the US already had its interests secured with Iran and Pakistan in the region. It felt that any additional efforts would only alarm the Soviet Union and resulting in the latter taking extreme steps. The US feared that any “overt western sponsored opposition” by the US in Afghanistan “might precipitate Soviet moves to take control of the country.” Hence, there was no major resistance by the US to the Soviet Union aiding Afghanistan

 

 

Certain events inside and outside Afghanistan, during 1978-79, altered the US perceptions of Afghanistan and Afghan-Soviet relations, Soviet interests in the region and finally the US interests in Afghanistan. This change resulted in direct US involvement in Afghanistan against Soviet Union

 

 

Firstly, Soviet–Afghan relations which was considered by the US as bilateral and outside the Cold War calculus, was, since 1979, viewed as part of Soviet cold war interests. The US wrongly believed that once the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) consolidated its rule, the Soviet Union would use Afghanistan as a launching pad to secure its objectives in the region. It was felt that the US should be “more sympathetic to those Afghans, who were determined to preserve their country’s independence.” Since April 1979, eight months before the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan , the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was supporting the anti-DRA (Democratic Republic of Afghanistan) demonstrations and monitoring military aid from Pakistan to the rebel groups in Afghanistan . The Soviet involvement in Afghanistan was viewed as a follow up to what had happened earlier in the Horn of Africa. ( Ethiopia and Somalia were fighting each other with the Soviet Union and Cuba supporting Ethiopia . The US was against Soviet involvement in the Horn of Africa, but failed to check its advances.)

 

 

Secondly, the toppling of the Shah regime in Iran by the Islamic radicals directly affected the strategic interests of the US . The regime change in Iran resulted in the loss of one of the US ’ front line states in the Middle East region and damaged its economic interests, especially, its oil interests in the Persian Gulf . The US and other Western countries rely on the 12 million barrels of oil a day from the Gulf.  Ensuring access to Gulf oil at reasonable prices, maintenance of a stable and productive balance of trade, and maintenance of political and military relations with the Gulf countries are primary strategic interests of United States . The loss of Iran directly affected the global economic interests of the US .

 

 

Thirdly, the regime change in Iran also meant losing a state which was a part of the US containment strategy against the Soviet Union . In other words, the loss of Iran affected the balance of power in the region. The US then did not realize that Iran was not lost to the Soviet Union , but to a fundamentalist group which the Soviet Union was also wary of in Afghanistan and even in its own provinces.

 

 

But the loss of Iran made the US realize that its strategic interests were at stake and take steps to counter them. With the Cold War between the two super powers having started in the Horn of Africa, the US took serious steps in Afghanistan before and after the Soviet Union sent its troops. 

 

 

Pakistan became the frontline state once again in the strategic framework of the US to contain the Soviet Union . The military assistance to Pakistan , which was stalled during the Ford and initial period of Carter’s administration, resumed in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan . US interests in Afghanistan continued till the Soviet troops left.

 
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