Home Contact Us
Search :
IPCS: Research Institutes in India
   

Afghanistan - Articles

Print Bookmark Email FacebookFacebook
#621, 23 October 2001
 
Chronicling the Afghanistan Tragedy – VI The Saur Revolution gone Sour
D Suba Chandran
Research Officer, IPCS
 

The Saur revolution, as was called by the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), was really a coup against Daud Khan, in which he was killed. Though the precise Soviet role in the Saur revolution is debatable, the Soviet Union did increase its commitment to the PDPA after the establishment of Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. 

The PDPA was founded in 1965, after King Zahir Shah introduced political reforms in 1964. Nur Mohammad Taraki, Babrak Karmal, Hafizullah Amin and Najibullah Ahmadzai were its prominent members. Unfortunately none of them are alive today – Taraki and Amin were killed in PDPA infighting; Karmal died of cancer in 1996 and Najibullah was hanged by the Taliban. The ideology of PDPA, according to its Constitution, “is the practical experience of Marxism-Leninism” and was “founded on the voluntary union of the progressive and informed people of Afghanistan: the workers, peasants, artisans and intellectuals of the country.” Many of are PDPA members were pro-Soviet and are either educated or received military training in Moscow. 

Three factors were mainly responsible for the Saur Revolution turning sour – internal struggle within the PDPA; radical social and economic reforms introduced by the PDPA in a primitive and predominantly tribal society; and the proximity of the PDPA to the Soviets.

Firstly, the PDPA had internal problems with Nur Mohammad Taraki and Babrak Karmal, the two main leaders, failing to agree on a common agenda. Both agreed on objectives but differed on the means to achieve them: Taraki favored radical social reforms while Karmal insisted on gradual social change.

Factors such as personal ambitions, social, class and ethnic differences led to the PDPA split in 1967. The Karmal faction was known as Parcham (Banner), the name of its newspaper, and the Taraki faction was known as Khalq (People or Masses), also the name of its newspaper. The Parcham faction was more westernized and composed mainly of the upper middle class, especially of Tajiks, whereas the Khalq faction had wider support mainly from the Pashtuns. After the formation of the PDPA and its split, both factions were allowed to recruit by the King and later by Daud. Consequently both factions recruited their cadres, from among teachers, police, civil servants, students and even military officers.

The differences between the two factions emerged immediately after the coup and formation of the government in Afghanistan. Taraki was elected as President of the Revolutionary Council, Prime minister of Afghanistan, and Secretary General of the PDPA. Karmal and Amin were elected as Deputy Prime Ministers. Factional problems within the PDPA resulted in the Khalq faction becoming powerful. The major leaders of the Parcham faction were sent abroad. Karmal was sent as Ambassador to Czechoslovakia and Najibullah to Iran. Amin was made Party Secretary, a position earlier held by Karmal, and controlled the Da Afghanistan da Gato Satalo Adara (Organisation for the Protection of the Security of Afghanistan), the new political force in Afghanistan.

Secondly, the social and economic reforms introduced by the PDPA led to its own demise. These reforms focused on ‘democratic land reforms’, ‘abolition of old feudal and pre-feudal relations’, ‘ensuring the equality of rights of women’, and increasing ‘the state sector of the national economy’. The failure of the PDPA to undertake reforms gradually, taking into account the cultural and religious sentiments of the population, and the significance attached by the PDPA on socialism resulted in a backlash, especially from the rural population, which remains predominantly tribal, backward and governed by local customs. Instead of recognising the nature of the problem, the PDPA used force to resolve it. A number of violent uncoordinated attacks started against the government. The public sentiments against the reforms were later used by various mujahideen groups to achieve their political objectives.

Thirdly, close relations between the PDPA and the Soviets alienated them from the local population. The rulers of Afghanistan till the 1990s were dictatorial and had close relations with the Soviets. Soviet arms were used for controlling the population and Soviet officials were consulted during serious crises or revolts to curb them. These anti-Soviet feelings were later fanned by the mujahideens, when they declared jihad against the Soviet Union

When armed anti-government activities began after May 1979, the PDPA government responded brutally against these uprisings. During this period, the internal problems within the PDPA reached its zenith. The support to Taraki by the Soviet Union alienated Amin, and in March 1979, Amin replaced Taraki. In September Amin imprisoned Taraki and killed him. Later, Amin tried to become independent of the Soviet Union because they, especially Brezhnev, had supported Taraki. Amin was killed and Babrak Karmal replaced him when the Soviet troops entered Afghanistan. Karmal did not have any popular support and was seen as a stooge of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. 

 
Article by same Author
Reading Pakistan: How does Pakistan see the War on Terrorism?

Reading Pakistan: Stand-Off on NATO Supply Line

‘Balochistan’ as a Strategic Issue vs the ‘Baloch’ as a Political Problem

Indo-Pak Nuclear CBMs: The Road to Nowhere

Af-Pak Diary: The Taliban Apologists, Opportunists and Opponents

A 'Delhi Discourse' with Central Asia: Reviving Linkages

Reading Pakistan: A New Taliban Shura

Af-Pak Diary: Exporting Sectarianism?

Reading Pakistan: What will follow the NATO Strikes?

Af-Pak Diary: Civil War and Instability as an Option in Afghanistan

Reading Pakistan: What if US-Pak Ties Break?

Reading Pakistan: Why is the Haqqani Network so Important?

Af-Pak Diary: From Ahmad Shah Massoud to Rabbani

Ten Years After: ‘Terror Franchisees’ as an Evolving Phenomenon

Ten Years After: Al Qaeda’s Game Plan

Af-Pak Diary: Will Mullah Omar Negotiate? What is Taliban's End Game?

Af-Pak Diary: Should India Adapt to the Game, or Attempt to Change It?

Reading Pakistan-IV: A War within Pakistan’s Security Establishment?

Reading Pakistan-III: Is Pakistan Jihad’s Lebensraum?

After Osama - VI: What will be the al Qaeda’s Game Plan?

After Osama - V: End the War on Terror?

Maulana Showkat Shah: One More Dead; How Many More To Go?

Reading Pakistan-III: Is Military the Only Glue?

Alternative Strategies for J&K: Before Next Summer

Reading Pakistan-II: Four Implications of Salman Taseer’s Assassination

ADD TO:
Blink
Del.icio.us
Digg
Furl
Google
Simpy
Spurl
Y! MyWeb
FacebookFacebook
 
Print Bookmark Email
 
 

The Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS) is the premier South Asian think tank which conducts independent research on and provides an in depth analysis of conventional and non-conventional issues related to national and South Asian security including nuclear issues, disarmament, non-proliferation, weapons of mass destruction, the war on terrorism, counter terrorism , strategies security sector reforms, and armed conflict and peace processes in the region.

For those in South Asia and elsewhere, the IPCS website provides a comprehensive analysis of the happenings within India with a special focus on Jammu and Kashmir and Naxalite Violence. Our research promotes greater understanding of India's foreign policy especially India-China relations, India's relations with SAARC countries and South East Asia.

Through close interaction with leading strategic thinkers, former members of the Indian Administrative Service, the Foreign Service and the three wings of the Armed Forces - the Indian Army, Indian Navy, and Indian Air Force, - the academic community as well as the media, the IPCS has contributed considerably to the strategic discourse in India.

 
Subscribe to Newswire | Site Map
B 7/3 Lower Ground Floor, Safdarjung Enclave, New Delhi 110029, INDIA.
Tel: 91-11-4100 1900, 4165 2556, 4165 2557, 4165 2558, 4165 2559 Fax: (91-11) 41652560
Email:
© Copyright 2012, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies.
        Web Design India Internet