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#612, 16 October 2001
 
Chronicling the Afghanistan Tragedy – IV The Great Game
D Suba Chandran
Research Officer, IPCS
 

The British and the Russians started showing interests in Afghanistan since the beginning of 19th century. The “Great Game”, as it came to be called later, started when Persia , with the Russian help, attempted to take over Herat during Dost Mohammad’s rule. 

 

 

The Russians’ interests in Central Asia commenced in the 1830s and they considered Afghanistan as a part of Central Asia . The then Tsarist Russia believed that it had a right and it alone can maintain peace in this area. Subsequent Russian interests in Afghanistan until the end of the Cold War in the 1980s were determined by the same concerns. 

 

 

Afghanistan was significant for Russia during this period for the following three reasons: First, the security of Russia ’s trade and the significance of Afghanistan in meeting those. Right from the period of Peter the Great in the eighteenth century, Russia had been looking for a warm water port to make its trade secure. An access through Afghanistan would always be in the interest of Russia ’s trade relations with other countries. Secondly, Tsarist Russia shared ethnic relations with Afghanistan , and it would be in the interest of Russia to see Afghanistan remaining peaceful. Afghanistan , either under the direct or indirect control of forces that are not friendly to Russia , can always create trouble among Russian subjects. Thirdly, the imperialist objectives of Russia in Afghanistan ; losing Afghanistan to other powers would undermine the dignity of Russia .

 

 

The British interests in Afghanistan were based on two factors. Firstly, they feared that advancement of Russian interests in Afghanistan would ultimately result in their monopoly being challenged in India . Secondly, the British believed that access to Afghanistan would result in Russia looking for a warm water port in this region, which would increase the economic and colonial prospects of Russia . In 1970s and 80s, the same concerns were reflected by the US

 

 

Lord Auckland, the British Governor General of India , sent a delegation in 1837 to Kabul , then under the control of Dost Mohamed. The British had already signed a Mutual Defence Treaty with Shuja Shah, in 1809, when he was in power for short period in Kabul . When Dost Mohamed failed to conclude any agreement with the British, Lord Auckland, decided in 1839 to support Shuja Shah against Dost Mohamed. The result was the first Anglo-Afghan War (1839-42).

 

 

With the British taking the first concrete steps in Afghanistan , Russia decided to take serious efforts to bring the Central Asian Khanates under its influence.  Russia , during the first half of the 19th century, then under the rule of the Tsars, was expanding slowly but steadily into the Central Asian region.

 

 

Following the frontward thrust of Russia towards Afghanistan , the British and the Russians signed an agreement in 1872, in which both countries agreed to make Amu Darya as the northern boundary of Afghanistan and the areas under Afghanistan were to remain outside the influence of Russia . In 1873, the British and the Russians agreed to create a land corridor between the British Indian territory in the northeastern Afghanistan and Russia ; this became the Wakhan Corridor.

 

 

In the second half of the 1870s, events that took place both inside the region and elsewhere made Russia and the British to advance the Great Game to Afghanistan . The Russians, by then, had lost their interest in Turkey . When the British occupied Quetta in 1876, Russians made advances in Afghanistan . They sent a diplomatic mission to seek a mutual assistance treaty with the Afghans against the British. This was accepted by the Amir reluctantly. The British also sent a mission to the Amir, with the same objectives, but the Amir did not give a response immediately. This resulted in the second Anglo-Afghan War. The Amir requested Russia for help to defend against the British, but the Russians were not willing to provide any assistance to him; the Congress of Berlin had just prevented the war in Europe

 

 

The second Anglo-Afghan war resulted in the Treaty of Gandamak in 1879. The Treaty was very significant for British interests in Afghanistan for two specific reasons. First, the treaty provided that Afghanistan ’s foreign policy thenceforth would be controlled by the Viceroy of India and British representatives would be stationed at Kabul ; and secondly, Afghanistan would cede some of its territories to British India , including the strategic Khyber Pass.

 

 

Tensions between the British and the Russians continued in Europe and that had an impact in Central Asia . Aware of Russian interests in Central Asia and Afghanistan , the British forced the Russians to agree for a boundary with Afghanistan . At the 1895 Pamir Convention, both Russia and British India fixed the boundary, except for a precise line along Amu Darya , which was finally settled in 1946. Russia agreed that Afghanistan would remain outside its influence and Britain agreed not to annex any more territory belonging to Afghanistan

 
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